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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; ’Twas 
mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;  
But he that filches from me my good name  
Robs me of that which not enriches him  
And makes me poor indeed.1 
 
Financial transaction information2 is very revealing.  By sifting 
through your credit and debit card transactions, your checks,3 your ATM 
archives, your credit application data, your stock portfolios, and your 
insurance records, financial institutions can discern, among other things, 
where you live; where you work; whether you own or rent your home; 
your age; what diseases you have; your height and weight; whether you 
take prescription medicine; your income to debt ratio; what products or 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
 2. No formal definition of the term “transaction data” exists, but as used herein, it 
refers to any personal information about a consumer that is collected by a commercial 
enterprise in the conducting of any business transaction with the consumer.  In the 
context of financial services, the transaction data will largely take the form of credit card 
transactions, check records and credit application data.  However, the data can also take 
the form of data collected in the financial institution’s dealings with the consumer (that 
is, a teller’s conversation with the customer at a bank) as well as data that may be 
purchased by a financial institution from various information databases.  For this reason, 
financial transaction data may include virtually every recorded fact about individual 
consumers and their behavior. 
 3. See Cal. Banker’s Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J. 
dissenting) (“In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes.  By examining 
them . . . [one] get[s] to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social 
connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he 
reads, and so on ad infinitum.”). 
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services you buy; what charities, political causes, or religious organizations 
you contribute to; your ethnic identity; your marital status; whether you 
have children; where, with whom, and when you travel; how you spend 
your leisure time; whether there has been a recent birth or death in your 
family; whether you have unusual or dangerous hobbies; and even 
whether you participate in certain felonious activities.4  Financial 
institutions collect, process, manipulate, barter, trade, and merge this 
transaction data with data from other sources, public and private,5 to 
produce a robust “profile”6 representing the economic, demographic, 
psychographic,7 and social identity of each customer.  This profile 
provides financial institutions and their affiliates and marketing partners 
with a detailed information picture of a consumer’s personality,8 
 
 4. For example, automatic teller machine (ATM) records can reveal which bank 
customers are procuring meretricious services.  SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: 
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 72  (2000).  Garfinkel refers to ATM 
archives as “hot files.”  Id. 
 5. For a description of the current scope of this type of activity, see FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC WORKSHOP: THE INFORMATION 
MARKETPLACE: MERGING AND EXCHANGING CONSUMER DATA (2001), available at 
http:www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomktplace/transcript.htm [hereinafter FTC INFO 
MARKETPLACE] (remarks of Lynn Wunderman). 
 6. The term “profile” has no formal definition, although it represents the end 
result of the processing of data by means of several technologies for data management 
discussed in Part II of this Comment, including data mining, Knowledge Discovery in 
Databases (KDD), data modeling, and the use of artificial intelligence to discover 
unknown patterns and new rules from large databases.  One author has defined it as, “the 
gathering, assembling, and collating of data about individuals in databases which can be 
used to identify, segregate, categorize and generally make decisions about individuals 
known to the decisionmaker only through their computerized profile.”  Karl D. Belgum, 
Who Leads at Half-Time?  Three Conflicting Visions of Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 8 (1999), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i1/belgum.html; see also 
PIETER ADRIAANS & DOLF ZANTINGE, DATA MINING v-vii (1996); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & 
JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 311–14 (1996).  By some accounts, profiles 
exist on almost every household in the United States.  See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, 
supra note 5 (remarks of Lynn Wunderman).  The accuracy of the data profile is, in large 
part, a function of the sheer magnitude of the data collected in financial transactions.  See 
STAN RAPP & CHUCK MARTIN, MAX-E-MARKETING IN THE NET FUTURE 17 (2001).  One 
large bank apparently had collected enough personally-identifiable consumer 
information to create a printout that reached “from the earth to the moon and back.”  Id. 
 7. See infra note 40. 
 8. Several related terms can be used to define the concept of self.  The word 
“personality” focuses on the multitude of particulars which identify an individual to the 
world or,  “the complex of characteristics that distinguishes an individual . . . or group; 
[especially] the totality of an individual’s behavioral and emotional characteristics.”  
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 878 (1989).  The word “persona” is a 
term of art connoting the “symbols or indicia which identify a unique human being . . . 
includ[ing] the name, likeness, voice, signature, character and other distinctive indicia by 
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including who that consumer is, what that consumer thinks, and what 
that consumer is apt to do next. 
Profiling is often spoken of with reference to the valuable social and 
economic benefits it will produce by enabling more efficient marketing 
and better customer service.9  Although surveys indicate that consumers 
are concerned about their transaction privacy,10 both industry 
spokespersons11 and government regulators12 have stressed that the 
 
which a specific person is identified by other persons.”  JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM 
PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 265–66 (Info. Law 
Series No. 5, 1996). 
 9. Microsoft Corporation founder, Bill Gates, stressed the efficiency of a world 
where every move of an individual is tracked by authenticating technology and where 
the resulting personally-identifiable information on all consumers will be readily 
accessible and tradable by corporate entities.  See BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 267–74 
(1995).  Gates referred to this phenomenon as the “documented life.”  Id. at 268.  He 
described as “backward looking” those who suggest that this technology may degrade 
the human spirit.  Id. at 274.  Microsoft Corporation markets a product that makes this 
profiled world possible.  See Alec Klein, Planting the Seeds; With Its ‘.Net’ Transition 
from the Desktop to the Web, Microsoft Could Reap New Dominance—and Scrutiny, 
WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at H1.  Michael Saylor, founder and CEO of MicroStrategy, 
Inc. is a prominent and vocal proponent of the “infinitely more intelligent, efficient and 
caring society” that useful sliced and diced personal information can provide.  See 
Michael Saylor, The Missing Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2000, at A17; see also Jean 
Schauer, An Executive Interview: MicroStrategy, DM REVIEW, Feb. 2001, at 
http://www.dmreview.com/master.cfm.  But see GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 5: 
  Many people today say that in order to enjoy the benefits of modern 
society, we must necessarily relinquish some degree of privacy. . . . 
  I think this tradeoff is both unnecessary and wrong.  It reminds me of 
another crisis our society faced back in the 1950s and 1960s—the 
environmental crisis. . . .  Poison was progress: anybody who argued otherwise 
simply didn’t understand the facts. 
For remarks highlighting the potential economic benefits of profiling, see DON PEPPERS 
& MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE FUTURE 5–6 (1993) (indicating that the “1:1 
future” will have a tremendous impact on personal privacy, but will also, “create an 
entrepreneurial froth of opportunities”); see also FRED H. CATE, PERSONAL INFORMATION 
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (Financial Services Coordinating Council 2000) (quoting 
Walter F. Kitchenman of the Tower Group when referring to the reporting of personal 
information about consumers as the “secret ingredient of the U.S. economy’s 
resilience”). 
 10. Ninety-five percent of people questioned would be either not very comfortable 
or not at all comfortable with the creation of a profile that contained personally-
identifiable information such as income and credit data.  Business Week/Harris Poll: A 
Growing Threat, BUS. WK., March 20, 2000, at 96.  Twenty-three percent of people 
questioned said that they believed that a bank had at some time violated their financial 
privacy.  Thomson Financial, Inc., A Crimp in Trust, FIN. SERVS. MARKETING, July 17, 
2001, at 21, 2001 WL 13521307.  Statistics show that almost half of consumers would 
not agree to allow the profiling of their information even if they were told what would be 
done with the information and were given the choice to opt-out of certain unapproved 
uses.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, June 2000, at 
16 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov./os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf 
[hereinafter ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT]. 
 11. The views of privacy consultant, Alan Westin, are frequently cited by industry.  
Mr. Westin segments the populace into three categories of consumer: the “Privacy 
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privacy of transaction data is best dealt with by industry self-regulation.  
However, there are some indications that industry self-regulation may be 
failing to protect consumer privacy, and therefore this approach is not 
without its critics.13  In fact, a consumer’s barter of his or her  
personality (embodied in personally-identifiable transaction data) to 
corporate entities may best be described as a Faustian bargain.14  And 
 
Fundamentalists,” the “Privacy Pragmatists,” and the “Privacy Unconcerned.”  He 
suggests that most consumers fall into the Privacy Pragmatists category, who value the 
benefits to be obtained from businesses’ profiling activities over any potential loss of 
privacy, and who therefore prefer industry self-regulation to any government legislative 
action.  The Privacy Fundamentalists (described as those who reject all claims of 
business entitlement to consumer’s personal data) are characterized as highly distrustful 
of government, business, and technology.  See Opinion Surveys: What Consumers Have 
to Say About Information Privacy, Hearing Before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (prepared testimony of Dr. Alan Westin, Professor 
Emeritus, Columbia University; President, Privacy and American Business).  Mr. 
Westin’s funding is largely derived from the substantial consulting fees he receives from 
multinational corporations that frequently lobby against privacy legislation.  Glenn 
Simpson, Consumer-Privacy Issue Turns a Retired Professor into a Hot Item, WALL ST. 
J., June 25, 2001, at A20. 
 12. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has held several studies on data privacy, 
most notably in the area of online profiling, but has repeatedly shied away from direct 
legislative action, stressing the economic benefits of profiling and the need to protect the 
nascent and economically vulnerable e-commerce industry.  The FTC has indicated that 
the “federal government currently has limited authority over the collection and 
dissemination of personal data collected on-line” absent a patently deceptive failure to 
comply with its stated information practices, and it lacks the authority to require a data 
collector to adopt any information practice policies.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY 
ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 40–41 (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
privacy3/priv-23a.pdf [hereinafter FTC 1998 REPORT].  The FTC has instead recommended 
a policy of industry self-regulation.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 20–25.  
See generally Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives, at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
privacy/index.html (last visited July 16, 2001). 
 13. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMENTS REGARDING ELEMENTS OF 
EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND QUESTIONS 
RELATED TO ONLINE PRIVACY, reprinted in 2001 PRACTISING L. INST., SECOND ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW 695, 701–09; Peter Henderson, Privacy Issue Splits Tech 
Camps: H-P Chief Presses for Web Legislation, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug. 21, 2001, 
at C2.  One privacy activist has indicated that the “notice and choice” self-regulatory 
approach adopted by the FTC operates more like a disclaimer or a warning label than 
any real privacy protection.  See Hearing on Privacy in the Commercial World Before 
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (2001) (Testimony and Statement for the 
Record of Marc Rotenberg), reprinted in SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, 
supra, at 305, 311.  The FTC has only recently taken up the issue of offline privacy.  See 
infra note 35. 
 14. The tale of Faust’s sale of his soul to Mephistopheles has been described as a 
morality play demonstrating the tensions between advancing technology and proper legal 
restraints.  See Manfred Lachs, Views from the Bench: Thoughts on Science, Technology 
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indeed, because a consumer is often oblivious to the fact that such a 
significant transaction has even taken place (either because the data 
exchange does not legally require the consumer’s consent or because the 
transfer is deemed permitted merely if the consumer fails to “opt-out”),15 
an individual’s transfer of his or her personality to the private sector is  
perhaps better described as a heist rather than as a bargained-for exchange. 
Although almost every sector of the U.S. economy practices consumer 
profiling,16 perhaps the most substantive challenge to consumer privacy is 
found in the activities surrounding the use and disclosure of consumer 
transaction data by the financial services industry.17  For that reason, this 
Comment focuses exclusively on consumer profiling in the context of 
the financial services sector, defined as banks, credit card issuers, 
brokerages, and insurance companies.18 
Necessary to any analysis of the possible impact on privacy posed by 
 
and World Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 673, 697 (1992).  Marlowe and Goethe penned the 
most famous accounts of the Faustian legend.  See CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, THE 
COMPLETE PLAYS (J. B. Steane ed., 1969); JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST: A 
TRAGEDY (Bayard Taylor, trans., 1887).  See generally PHILIP MASON PALMER & ROBERT 
PATTISON MORE, THE SOURCES OF THE FAUST TRADITION: FROM SIMON MAGUS TO 
LESSING (1965).  Posner’s contractual analysis of the Faust legend concludes that the 
bargain was void against public policy.  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 
110–14 (rev. and enl. ed. 1998).  At least Faust negotiated a tangible reward of twenty-
four years of worldly pursuits in exchange for his soul.  In comparison, U.S. consumers 
obtain a mere illusory promise that they will receive improved customer service and 
perhaps fewer unwanted “Nike[™] ads” in exchange for their personality profiles.  See 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 154–55 (1999). 
 15. “Opt-out” is a term of art, meaning the setting of a default rule whereby a data 
collector need not obtain express consent prior to using or disclosing a consumer’s 
personal data.  See infra note 22.  Some suggest that there is a “misunderstanding gap” 
between actual data collection, merger, and exchange practices versus the beliefs of 
consumers concerning those practices.  See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 
(closing remarks of Joel Winston).  A consumer often receives either no notice at all of 
the sale of her information or her consent is implied by her failure to affirmatively opt-
out of data sharing.  See Beth Givens, Financial Privacy: The Shortcomings of the 
Federal Financial Services Modernization Act, Presentation before the California Bar 
Association (Sept. 15, 2000), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fin_privacy.htm. 
 16. See generally FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5. 
 17. See Rachel Zimmerman & Glenn R. Simpson, Lobbyists Swarm to Stop Tough 
Privacy Bills in States, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2000, at A16 (“For all the talk about the 
Internet’s potential to become the ultimate surveillance tool, the most invasive data-
collection practices now in use involve credit, banking, housing and health data that 
consumers have given out for years.”). 
 18. But this category is not as limiting as it may seem at first glance.  Consider that 
General Motors Corporation offers home mortgages; Sears and Nordstrom issue 
MasterCard and Visa products.  See Michael Staten, Customer Relationship Management 
as a Privacy Enhancer, at http://www.acxiom.com/ DisplayMain/0,1494,USA~en~990~ 
1244~0~0,00.html (May, 2001).  This phenomenon is referred to as the “super industry” 
where telecommunications, computers, financial services, and retailing industries 
compete for the same customers, with the same products.  Rashi Glazer, Marketing and 
the Changing Information Environment: Implications for Strategy, Structure, and the 
Marketing Mix, in USING MARKET KNOWLEDGE 127, 138 (Rohit Deshpandé ed., 2001). 
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consumer profiling is an understanding of the technology itself.  Thus, 
Part II describes the profiling technology currently utilized by the 
financial services industry and then discusses the technological advances 
in profiling technology that are likely to be used by financial services in 
the near future. 
Next, Part III critically reviews some of the social and economic 
effects that are likely to accompany the widespread use of profiling 
technology in the financial services sector.  As Part III demonstrates, the 
practice of financial profiling produces important social and economic 
impacts and has the potential to undermine the existing statutory 
safeguards regarding the use and disclosure of sensitive personal 
financial information. 
Next, Part IV focuses on the current laws that address financial 
privacy and illustrates that at present there are no real constitutional or 
statutory protections in place for consumers who desire to prevent the 
profiling of their financial information by the private sector.  Furthermore, 
Part IV reviews recently enacted financial privacy legislation and 
suggests that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)19 not only fails to 
address the issue of financial profiling but, by its creation of financial 
holding companies,20 may even facilitate and encourage the greater use 
of profiling by financial institutions. 
Part V of this Comment therefore urges the courts to recognize a 
common law right of privacy under which a consumer may control the 
use and disclosure of his or her data profile.  Although rumors of the 
death of the right of privacy abound,21 this Comment proposes that such 
pessimism is unfounded and that the inherently invasive nature of 
profiling technology may introduce renewed vigor into the application of 
 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6810 (2000). 
 20. Id.  A financial holding company is the creation of Title I of the GLBA, and 
allows banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to align under a holding 
company structure or as financial subsidiaries.  15 U.S.C. § 6809.  See also CCH INC., 
FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION: GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, at 21 
(Kenneth R. Benson et al. eds., 1999).  Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, referred to these financial holding companies as “financial 
‘supermarkets’” with an “unprecedented ability to compile comprehensive data profiles 
on their customers.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PUBLIC 
WORKSHOP: THE INFORMATION MARKETPLACE: MERGING AND EXCHANGING CONSUMER 
DATA, (2001) (Comments of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse), at 
http://www.ftc.gov.bcp/workshops/infomktplace/comments/givens.htm [hereinafter 
GIVENS FTC COMMENTS]. 
 21. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to 
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983). 
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both the privacy intrusion on seclusion tort and the appropriation privacy 
tort to information privacy issues. 
Part V further demonstrates that the privacy tort may reformulate the 
current opt-out paradigm22 by bringing into question the ability of 
financial institutions to contract for unreasonably broad rights to use and 
disclose consumers’ private information merely by publishing a privacy 
policy.  Part V then demonstrates that on the basis of a breach of the 
common law right of privacy, a consumer may then utilize state 
consumer protection statutes to vindicate this right. 
The quiet erosion of privacy by consumer profiling may be an issue 
that is ignored at our peril.  Justice Brandeis wrote: “All law is a dead 
letter without public opinion behind it.  But law and public opinion 
interact—and they are both capable of being made.”23  This Comment 
therefore attempts to provide a glimpse of the potential socioeconomic 
impacts of financial profiling in order to encourage public and judicial 
opinion toward the recognition and enforcement of a consumer’s right to 
refuse the appropriation of his or her data personality for commercial 
purposes that exceed the scope of their reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
II.  THE TECHNOLOGY OF PROFILING 
“You have zero privacy anyway—get over it.”24 
Consumer profiling is a growing trend in the financial services 
industry.25  This business trend was brought about by several converging 
technological and theoretical changes.  First, transaction data is no 
longer being looked at as simply information, but rather as a commodity 
in and of itself.  Second, the data warehouse is enabling the processing 
and storage of data in ways never before thought possible.  Third, new 
software technologies now allow data exchange where communication 
 
 22. Perhaps the best definition of this paradigm is as follows: ‘“Opt-out’ means 
that financial institutions can share or sell customer information without their affirmative 
up-front consent.  If customers do not tell the bank to refrain from selling their data, such 
sale will go on indefinitely.  ‘Opt-in’ means that the default is set [on] ‘no sharing.’”  
Givens, supra note 15. 
 23. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Dec. 28, 1890), in 1 
LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 97 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971). 
 24. This remark has been attributed to Sun Microsystems Inc.’s chief executive 
officer, Scott McNealy, apparently spoken to a group of analysts and reporters at a 
meeting celebrating the introduction of Sun’s new data-sharing technology.  See Andrew 
Roth, A New Privacy Flash Point, Courtesy of IBM?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2001, at 1.   
 25. Staten, supra note 18 (describing current and potential CRM processes at 
Wachovia Bank, Fidelity Investments, and Citigroup). 
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difficulties had previously prevented it.  Fourth, a unified market for the 
exchange and sale of transaction data profiles has emerged. 
A.  Financial Transaction Data: From Information                                       
to Commodity 
Until relatively recently, financial institutions merely processed consumer 
financial information and did not use it for marketing or other revenue 
generating purposes.26  The limitations of technology and the relatively 
high cost of storing and processing massive amounts of data made it 
economically unfeasible for banks to peer into their customers’ personal 
details.27  But as this Part later demonstrates, the limitations on transaction 
surveillance are quickly evaporating with the relentless technological 
advances and price decreases in data warehousing and data mining 
technology.  An additional impetus to this surveillance is provided by data 
exchange technology that both encourages the transfer and sale of data 
and facilitates the increasingly symbiotic relationship that has arisen 
between financial services companies and marketing organizations.28  The 
shift in technology has resulted in a paradigm shift in the meaning and 
value of information itself.29  Information no longer fills its traditional role 
of the “interaction[s] between environmental stimuli and intelligent 
organisms,”30 but now fills a role as a marketable product in itself.31 
 
 26. Many banks have apparently been collecting consumer information for some 
time, but some had absolutely no idea what on earth to do with the data until most 
recently.  See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Elisabeth Brown); 
RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 17. 
 27. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Elisabeth Brown) 
(stating that banks have not done much with their sensitive consumer information until 
very recently because of the lack of large databases and the software capability to 
property manipulate and update the information).  One other gating factor for banks has 
been the silos in which most information has been kept.  See GARTNER GROUP, 
RESEARCH NOTE, BANK DATA WAREHOUSING: ALIVE (THOUGH SOMEWHAT AILING) 2 
(2001).  Unlinked data marts result in “inconsistent usage, data redundancy and multiple 
versions of ‘the truth.’”  Id.  But see infra Part II.D for a discussion of why data silos will 
soon cease to be a limiting factor. 
 28. See, e.g., FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Lynn 
Wunderman) (discussing First USA as a key contributor to a data co-op).  See infra notes 
70–71 for a description of data co-ops. 
 29. See generally Glazer, supra note 18, at 129 (“A major theme of this generation 
has been the onset of the ‘information age,’ a time in which information, or knowledge, 
replaces matter and energy as the primary resource of society.”). 
 30. Id. at 131–32. 
 31. Id. at 149–50.  Professor Rashi Glazer of the Haas School of Business, 
University of California, Berkeley, states that the paradigm shift under which 
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Technology companies predictably welcome this paradigm shift as an 
opportunity to gain market share.32  Bill Gates sees the networked, 
profiled, information-commodified future.33  In his book discussing the 
future of the Internet, he described a world where massive amounts of 
data would be collected on individuals with the help of numerous 
authenticating devices operating at ubiquitous data collection points, 
both inside and outside the home.34  Although Internet privacy has 
attracted most of the attention until very recently,35 as Gates illustrated, 
the Internet is just one of many collection points for transaction data in 
the newly evolving “database nation.”36 
And financial data is the gold standard for transaction data.  Unlike 
consumer data gathered from census data, from surveys, or from cookie-
enabled37 websites such as Amazon.com, which is generally anonymous,38 
financial data is, by its nature, personally identifiable unless the account 
 
information has become a “marketable asset” is only a very recent phenomenon which is 
fundamentally redefining the “rules of the game” for commercial transactions.  Id. at 
138, 150. 
 32. See, e.g., Acxiom Corporation, Customer Data Integration: Realizing the 
Promise of Customer Relationship Management, at http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain 
/0,1494,USA~en~374~1737~0~0~,00.html (2001).  Acxiom Corporation estimates that a 
market leader in the customer data integration space would reap up to $5 billion of a total 
market estimated to reach as much as $15 billion by 2004.  Id.  MicroStrategy 
Corporation Chairman and CEO, Michael Saylor, looks forward to making “intelligence” 
a tenth of the economy.  See Schauer, supra note 9, at http://www.dmreview.com/ 
master.cfm. 
 33. See GATES, supra note 9, at 218–21, 266, 274. 
 34. See Id.  However, apparently Gates believes this new privacy-invading interior 
design is only for the masses.  When discussing the design of the living quarters of his 
own house, Gates said: “[P]rivacy is important.”  Id. at 218. 
 35. The FTC has only recently taken up the issue of offline consumer privacy 
issues.  See generally FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5.  Beth Givens, Director of 
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse noted in her comments to the FTC Public Workshop 
on the Information Marketplace that her organization receives a greater amount of 
complaints about offline privacy matters than it does about online privacy.  See GIVENS 
FTC COMMENTS, supra note 20. 
 36. The term “database nation” was coined by privacy advocate Simson Garfinkel. 
GARFINKEL, supra note 4. 
 37. A “cookie” is a small text message sent by a Web server, which is stored by 
the browser in a text file called “cookie.txt.”  The cookie then enables the Web site to 
receive information on the Web site visitor’s preferences.  See Leon Stiel, An 
Introduction to Privacy Technologies and Techno-Speak, reprinted in SECOND ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, supra note 13, at 33, 48. 
 38. See ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.  Several Web sites 
have recently attempted to integrate anonymous Internet transaction data with databases 
that convert it into personally identifiable information.  The consumer backlash has 
spawned class action lawsuits.  See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. 
Supp. 2d 497  (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Supnick v. Amazon.com, No. C00-0221P, 2000 WL 
1603820 (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2000) (certifying class action); In re RealNetWorks, Inc. 
Privacy Litig., No. 1329, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1458 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 10, 2000).  See 
generally Charles L. Kerr, Online Privacy: Recent Developments, reprinted in SECOND 
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, supra note 13, at 51, 66–111. 
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
[VOL. 39:  943, 2002]  Consumer Profiling in Financial Services 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 953 
number, social security number, or other identifying characteristic is 
either encrypted39 or deleted.  Because financial data includes information 
on purchasing behavior, it is deemed “psychographic data” and is 
therefore considered determinate of future behavior.40  Thus, it is not 
hard to understand why personally-identifiable financial data and the 
value of the information therein may easily be termed the new currency 
of this century.41  Indeed, the former chairman of Citicorp referred to the 
information standards for the movement of personal and nonpersonal 
financial data as the equivalent of money in global financial markets.42  
In order to fully understand how that raw data can turn to gold, it is 
necessary to review the technology behind data warehousing and 
computer profiling, as well as the mechanisms supporting data 
exchange. 
B.  The Data Warehouse 
Transaction data normally resides in something called a data 
warehouse.43  And the data warehouse makes good business sense for 
 
 39. Encrypted information is almost impossible to decipher in a database without 
the use of the accompanying encryption key.  See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, 
at 81. 
 40. ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5 n.18 (“Psychographic data 
links objective demographic characteristics like age and gender with more abstract 
characteristics related to ideas, opinions and interests.”).  Psychographic information is 
“incredibly powerful information from a segmentation standpoint” and thus is highly 
valuable to marketers.  Id.  Psychographic information is found in purchase behavior, 
and personally identifiable data on purchase patterns is generally very difficult for 
marketers to obtain on a global level, except where it is obtained voluntarily from 
consumer survey or warranty card sources.  See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 
(remarks of Lynn Wunderman). 
 41. See Zimmerman & Simpson, supra note 17.  Financial firms and telemarketers 
consider personally-identifiable financial transaction data “among their most valuable 
assets.”  Id.; cf. Bob Sullivan, Bank Crime Data Theft on the Rise, MSN, June 26, 2002 
(“Your concern is no longer a teller walking out the door with cash . . . .  Your concern is 
information walking out the door.  That’s the new currency.  You’ve got to think: 
information equals cash.” (quoting fraud expert, Rob Douglas)), http://msnbc.com/news/ 
772723.asp?pne=msn&cpl=1 (last visited June 28, 2002). 
 42. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 261–62. 
 43. The data warehouse is not actually a product or a place, but rather is a process 
or a “staging area” for the collection, integration, storage and delivery of information.  
See INT’L DATA CORP., THE FOUNDATIONS OF WISDOM: A STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL 
IMPACT OF DATA WAREHOUSING 2 (1996), available at http://www.teradatalibrary. 
com/pdf/idc_010196.pdf  (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).  Data warehouses are the engines 
that drive the decision support systems that utilize data mining software to find hidden 
information in data.  See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, at 25–36.  See also infra 
note 51 for a discussion of data mining software. 
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the financial services industry.  Not only have hardware, software, and 
data storage costs declined significantly in the past few years,44 but  
empirical evidence shows that companies will rapidly reap a significant 
return on their investment in such a system.45  In fact, the economic 
benefits of the data warehouse are so compelling, that the few banks that 
do not already possess this technology are now in the process of 
developing or procuring it.46  The reduction in costs for a data 
warehousing system has encouraged the financial services industry to 
store massive amounts of consumer transaction data spanning over many 
years.47  But, price and performance metrics aside, the real driving force 
for the growth in data warehousing is the increasing sophistication of the 
software analytical tools that enhance the value of the information stored 
therein.48  Stored raw data is of limited value, absent a corporation’s 
ability to manipulate and correlate the data to create consumer profiles.  
Profiling produces economic value.49  The equation thus feeds on itself: 
 
 44. Price declines have been brought about by increased competition among direct 
access storage device (DASD) manufacturers, as well as by technical advances in storage 
devices.  Industry software and hardware giants like IBM Corporation, Informix, Inc., 
Oracle Corporation and NCR Corporation compete for a greater share of their corporate 
customers’ information technology budgets by waging a war of terabyte capacity per 
dollar.  See Lou Agosta, Data Warehouse Volume Growth Continues, IDEABYTE, June 5, 
2001, available at http://www.teradatalibrary.com/pdf/giga_060501.pdf (last visited Oct. 
27, 2001).  System manufacturers compete for the top performance in TPC Benchmark 
tests.  According to Giga Information Group, the most recent Transaction Processing 
Performance Council (TPC) Benchmark indicates that the overall price versus 
performance metric for a multi-terabyte decision support system shows costs per 3000 
GB to be as low as $999.  Id.  A terabyte is defined as “a measure of computer storage 
capacity and is 2 to the 40th power or approximately a thousand billion bytes.”  
SearchStorage.com, at http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid5_gci 
213118,00.html (last visited March 16, 2002).  Aetna Insurance Corporation was 
recently reported to possess 174.6 terabytes of customer information.  See Barry Nance, 
Managing Tons of Data, COMPUTERWORLD, April 23, 2001, at 62, available at http://www. 
computerworld.com/hardwaretopics/hardware/server/story/0,10801,59819,0.html. 
 45. A survey by International Data Corporation indicated that a company will 
receive an average three-year return on investment of 401% from a data warehouse 
implementation.  INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 5. 
 46. See META GROUP, DATA WAREHOUSE SCORECARD: COST OF OWNERSHIP AND 
SUCCESSES IN APPLICATION OF DATA WAREHOUSE TECHNOLOGY 1, available at 
http://www.teradatalibrary.com/pdf.  Fully eighty-five percent of all banks utilize either 
a data warehouse, a data warehouse with data marts, or unlinked data marts to store data.  
In the interest of pursuing “revenue-producing opportunities” and obtaining one view of 
the customer, many banks with unlinked data marts are now working to consolidate 
them.  See GARTNER GROUP, supra note 27. 
 47. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 1, 4–5.  Royal Bank of Canada, for 
example, has been collecting customer data since 1978.  This data has recently been used 
by the bank to create profiles on nine million of their personal retail clients.  See NCR 
CORPORATION, CUSTOMER SUCCESS STORIES: ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1, 5 (2000), 
available at http://www.teradatalibrary.com/pdf/eb1323.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2001). 
 48. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 1. 
 49. See, e.g., Nance, supra note 44 (“Multiple terabytes of the most pampered, 
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increased storage of data drives the increased use of profiling; the value 
of profiled data creates a value proposition to justify the increased 
collection and storage of data.50 
C.  Software Applications 
The various software applications that are used to extract hidden 
information out of data are grouped under the evocative term, “data 
mining.”51  Companies are spending vast amounts of money to procure 
data mining software in the hopes of leveraging off of the value inherent 
in the data piling up in their data warehouses.52  Customer relationship 
management (CRM)53 software, which utilizes statistical modeling 
techniques54 on transaction data to analyze a customer’s potential future 
purchase behavior,55 is estimated to grow at a rate of forty percent per 
year, and to capture between $10 and $20 billion of the corporate 
 
best-maintained data in the world are just a slag heap of bits without accurate, 
meaningful data definitions and schemas.”). 
 50. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 1 (“The organizations studied by IDC 
provided ample evidence that [the goal of leveraging data to make better decisions] is 
well worth the effort, and cost, of building effective data warehouses.”). 
 51. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, at 47 (explaining that data mining is 
an idea and generally describes the process of finding hidden information in data).  The 
various tools that are included under the definition are: query tools, statistical techniques, 
visualization, online analytical processing (OLAP), case-based learning, decision trees, 
association rules, neural networks, and genetic algorithms.  Id.  While Data mining only 
describes the discovery process, knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) is a more 
general term describing the “whole process of extraction of knowledge from data” and 
includes machine learning, statistics, database technology, expert systems and data 
visualization.  Id. at 5. 
 52. See Acxiom Corporation, supra note 32.  International Data Corporation (IDC) 
data indicates that $90 billion was spent by corporations in 1999 for data warehousing, 
enterprise resource management (ERM) and customer relationship management (CRM) 
products and that the expected growth rates would double by 2002.  Id. 
 53. CRM is a term used to describe the utilization of analytical and decisioning 
tools on front and back office data to look at an individual’s profile to predict their future 
purchasing patterns.  A primary use of the technology is to identify the most profitable 
customers.  See Judith Lamont, Analytical CRM: Capturing Data to Cater to Customers, 
KMWORLD, Feb. 2001, at 16, available at http://www.kmworld.com/publications/ 
magazine/index.cfm?action=readarticle&article_id=987&publication_id=1. 
 54. For an example of a CRM model, see MICHEL WEDEL & WAGNER A. 
KAMAKURA, MARKET SEGMENTATION: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
316–20 (2d ed. 2000). 
 55. CRM software may have fallen short of its technological promise, however.  
See Kevin Fogarty, Is CRM a Faint Hope?, COMPUTERWORLD, June 4, 2001, at 50.  In 
Mr. Fogarty’s words, CRM was a “boondoggle.”  Id. 
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
 
956 
information technology expenditures in 2001 alone.56  But CRM is 
quickly being eclipsed by a superior technology referred to as “business 
intelligence.”57  Business intelligence software uses advanced data 
visualization tools and artificial intelligence, 58 often in the form of 
neural networks,59 to find hidden patterns in data that human users might 
overlook.60 
The development of CRM and business intelligence software has 
changed the data warehouse from a tool used to improve process 
efficiency and collect data into a tool used to construct and analyze 
individual consumer profiles and to predict individual consumers’ future 
behavior.61  Companies use this software to process a consumer’s 
transaction data in order to extract an expression of the consumer’s very 
personality, which is then distilled down into a convenient packet of 
computer code.62  That simulated personality can then be internally used 
by a company for its commercial advantage for purposes such as 
customer relationship management and predictive marketing—or that 
personality can be sold. 
 
 56. Id.; Lamont, supra note 53, at 16. 
 57. One industry pundit pauses to assure us that this term is not an oxymoron.  
Dan Miller, 5 Technologies You Need to Know, INDUSTRY STANDARD, at 
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,24308,00.html (May 21, 2001). 
 58. Artificial Intelligence refers to computer systems that self-learn or otherwise 
model human knowledge.  See KENNETH C. LAUDON ET AL., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
AND SOCIETY 491–50 (1994). 
 59. The most common form of artificial intelligence is found in neural networks.  
Neural networks attempt to mimic the operation of the human brain by means of 
thousands of transistors connected in a network.  See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 
6, at 2–3, 68–78; LAUDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 497.  Neural networks have been 
criticized as “black boxes” that produce a decisioning system that is impossible to audit 
for discriminatory criteria.  See generally Marcia Stepanek, Weblining, BUS. WK., April 
3, 2000, at EB26, EB33 (stating that the value assumptions used by the black box 
software cannot be determined with precision even by the system’s developers). 
 60. See ADRIAANS & ZANTINGE, supra note 6, at 68–78.  One industry analyst 
discussed business intelligence as a further generation of the technology provided in 
knowledge management and data mining.  Miller, supra note 57.  Business intelligence 
uses artificial intelligence to discover unexpected patterns in data.  Id.  The market for 
business intelligence software is expected to grow to $8.8 billion in 2004, and the 
corporate players include giants such as IBM Corporation, Oracle Corporation, SAP, 
Computer Associates and Microsoft Corporation.  Id.  According to Michael Saylor, 
CEO of MicroStrategy Corporation, business intelligence can come in several forms: 
analytics (optimal merchandizing, inventory, fraud detection), narrowcasting (predictive 
analytics, arbitrage, and demand activation) and “embedded intelligence” (for example, a 
“bank account that moves its own cash around”).  See Schauer, supra note 9, at 
http://www.dmreview.com/master.cfm. 
 61. See INT’L DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 4, 12. 
 62. Customer behavior as recorded in transaction data has been referred to in 
Business Week magazine as a “silicon simulacrum.”  Jonathan Berry et al., A Potent New 
Tool for Selling: Database Marketing, BUS. WK., Sept. 5, 1994, at 56, 58. 
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D.  Profile Exchange Mechanisms 
As a major financial industry publication recently pointed out, the 
current inability of different file formats to “speak the same language” 
has up to now been a major enforcer of consumer privacy.63  But the 
commercial rewards to be gained have spawned an entire industry 
focused on developing universal data exchange mechanisms to 
overcome this barrier.  The XML, or extensible markup language64 
platform, has been termed the “lingua franca of cyberspace”65 and has 
the potential to enable the widespread sharing of data over the Internet.66  
Another such mechanism for information sharing in development, the 
Customer Profile Exchange Network, is based on the XML format and is 
backed by a consortium of technology companies and several financial 
services industry partners.67  Data from disparate sources that does not 
utilize one of these universal communication languages can otherwise be 
unified by universal data exchange software applications.68  The 
 
 63. See Roth, supra note 24. 
 64. See Klein, supra note 9.  Microsoft Corporation is developing its Hailstorm 
technology on the XML platform.  Hailstorm is part of Microsoft’s .Net initiative and 
may prove to be particularly invasive because it is being designed to work only in 
conjunction with an authentication and identification device.  Id.  American Express 
entered discussions with Microsoft to partner in the .Net initiative to offer its cardholders 
instant notification of potential fraud on their account.  Id. 
 65. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Richard Smith). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Backers of the consortium include International Business Machines Corporation, 
Hewlett-Packard Company, Intuit, Lucent Technology, First Union National Bank, 
HSBC-USA, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Charles Schwab Corporation.  See Roth, supra 
note 24.  First Union Corporation released a statement indicating that they valued their 
customers’ privacy and that they joined the consortium “to stay informed of new 
technologies and how those technologies will benefit our customers.”  Id.  For more 
information on the consortium, see Customer Profile Exchange Network, at 
http://www.cpexchange.org.  As of March 2001, the consortium had over ninety 
corporate members.  See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Dana 
Rosenfeld). 
 68. Acxiom Corporation recently introduced a product called AbiliTecsm, enabling 
one view of the customer to be built out of disparate data sources.  See ABERDEENGROUP, 
ANNOUNCEMENT PROFILE, ACXIOM’S ABILITEC: KEY TO CREATING A TOTAL CUSTOMER 
VIEW (1999), available at http://acxiom.com/interactive/dpdwebdev/productsandservices 
/brochure/pdfs/aberdeen.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).  Hummingbird Communications 
highlights the significant cost reductions and increased efficiency their universal data 
exchange product can provide to a company dealing with information from disparate 
systems or databases.  See HUMMINGBIRD COMMUNICATIONS LTD., UNIVERSAL DATA 
EXCHANGE: AN ENTERPRISE-WIDE SOLUTION (2000), available at http://www. 
hummingbird.com/collateral/universaldataexchange_whitepaper_EN.pdf (last visited May 
25, 2002). 
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resulting ease of data transfer and data matching has encouraged the 
formation of “data intermediaries”69 and “co-op database[s],”70 where 
information and profiles containing the life traces of individuals are 
offered and purchased like any other commodity.71  Data exchange is also 
increased by the fact that data sharing is increasingly de rigueur between 
alliance partners under today’s marketing alliance agreement.72  To quell 
consumers’ concerns over the loss of their privacy, many of the companies 
selling information exchange technology argue that their technologies 
enforce customer privacy preferences while still allowing the free flow of 
data.73  But some are skeptical that these technologies will be utilized in a 
way that will give consumers any real privacy protections.74 
 
 69. A “data compiler” is defined as a “third party organization[ ] that collect[s], 
slice[s], and dice[s] and then resell[s] consumer data.”  See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, 
supra note 5 (remarks of Professor Culnan).  A data compiler will not usually have a 
direct relationship with the data subject.  Id.  One data compiler refers to itself as an 
“infomediary.”  Id. (remarks of Johnny Anderson).  The data compilers apparently 
operate on an informal consortium basis amongst themselves.  Allison Brown, an 
attorney for the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection remarked at the FTC Public 
Workshop on the Information Marketplace that “[o]ne thing that becomes clear pretty 
quickly is how integrated the aggregators are with the sources and how the data sort of 
rotate in and out of the different databases.”  Id. (remarks of Allison Brown).  According 
to the statement of one participant at this FTC workshop, even data on pharmaceutical 
purchases and doctor’s visits may end up in the hands of the data compilers.  Id. 
(remarks of Michael Pashby). 
 70. The term “co-op database” refers to an arrangement where members of the co-
op pool their customer transaction data and profiles in order to gain the opportunity to 
receive the data contributed by other members.  Id. (remarks of Lynn Wunderman). 
 71. This information marketplace is a phenomenon distinct to the U.S.  One theory 
of why U.S. mortgage rates are up to two percent lower than those in Europe is that the 
standardized consumer credit information in the U.S. makes wider securitization 
possible.  See CATE, supra note 9, at 4.  One European participant at the FTC Public 
Workshop on the Information Marketplace expressed his disbelief and outrage at the 
U.S. information marketplace as follows: “[W]here will it end?  At which point do I say, 
[t]his data is sacrosanct, you cannot have access to it . . . will it just be taken for granted 
that this is just another piece of information that can be used to market to me?”  See FTC 
INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Mark Le Maitre). 
 72. See RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 137 (indicating that information sharing 
is expected by most businesses entering into any form of alliance agreement). 
 73. See, e.g., Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, What’s Ahead for Privacy: Technology 
Has Taken away Privacy.  Now It Promises To Give It Back, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2001, 
at R-17.  An analyst at Forrester Research indicated that the Customer Profile Exchange 
will manage data at such a granular level that consumer privacy preferences will be able 
to follow information as it is passed along.  See Roth, supra note 24.  An Acxiom 
Corporation spokesperson made the argument that their data matching software and the 
increased profiling that it will enable will foster an increasingly personalized customer 
experience which will build trust in the merchant and thus alleviate a consumer’s privacy 
concerns.  See Staten, supra note 18. 
 74. See e.g., FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Richard Smith) 
(expressing skepticism that the privacy controls in the Consumer Profile Exchange 
would be implemented); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: 
Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 
743, 751–55 (2000) (referring to the “blinking twelve” problem; that is, privacy system 
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The silo walls are falling down.  This is a revolution, albeit a silent 
one.75  It thus behooves us to stop to consider the socioeconomic effects 
of this information revolution. 
III.  PROFILING: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
“Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?  Where is 
the knowledge we have lost in information?” 76 
A.  Social Effects 
Proponents of the information revolution often depict the social 
benefits of profiling as a return to the good old days where shopkeepers 
knew their customers by name, knew their special preferences, and thus 
interjected a personal element into the commercial experience.77  One 
proponent even referred to data profiling and the resulting customer 
relationship management techniques as the “old fashioned” way of doing 
business.78  But others are less sanguine about the social effects of a 
commercial ecosystem built on profiling79 and have sought to distinguish 
profiling from traditional marketing practices.  One important difference 
is rooted in the permanent record that transaction data leaves behind.  As 
Lawrence Lessig states: 
Gossipy neighbors might have watched, but their watching produced nothing as 
lasting or as reliable as . . . a credit card system’s endless collection of data 
about your purchases, or the telephone system’s records of who you called 
when and for how long. . . . Then the technology noticed only what was 
different; now it notices any transaction.80 
 
defaults will be set to allow data transfer and consumers will respond in the same manner 
as they do to their VCRs, which they have absolutely no clue how to reprogram).  This 
author’s own example of this phenomenon is that because every new version of 
Microsoft Explorer seems to make the “disable cookies” function more inconvenient for 
her to locate than it was before, she tends not to bother. 
 75. See Glazer, supra note 18, at 127, 129.  Lawrence Lessig compared the 
information revolution to the breakup of the Soviet Union in regard to its far-reaching 
consequences.  See LESSIG, supra note 14, at 234. 
 76. T.S. Eliot, THE ROCK pt. I (1934). 
 77. See, e.g., PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 9, at 21; Siebel Corporation 
Advertisement (CBS Television Network, June 24, 2001) (viewed by author). 
 78. See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 9, at 21. 
 79. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra, note 14, at 154–56; Schwartz, supra note 74, at 746–
49.  See generally Stepanek, supra note 59. 
 80. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 151.  In fact, if any analogy can be drawn to an 
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Furthermore, traditional interchanges of information always left 
consumers with a choice of which information was to be shared with the 
merchant and which information they chose to keep secret.  Computer 
profiling takes away the consumer’s choice of providing selective 
information to others.  Although this full disclosure could produce a 
positive result by providing businesses with a practical means of 
preventing consumer fraud, it could also provide businesses with a new 
means of manipulating their customers.81  This manipulation could take 
the form of a discriminatory regime of customer ranking based on 
existing prejudices, which some have suggested will ossify society and 
chill free association and behavioral autonomy.82 
The customer ranking that accompanies profiling is already well 
entrenched in the financial services sector.83  Sanwa Bank gives As to its 
best customers, but those whose profile indicates that they will produce 
less profit for the bank earn Cs.84  Predictably, the bank tends to charge 
those earning Cs more fees and puts them on hold more often and for 
longer periods of time.85  Statistics show that eighty percent of a bank’s 
profit is gained from only twenty percent of their customers.86  It is 
therefore no surprise that evidence indicates that banks utilize profiling 
software not only to provide superior customer service, but also to 
 
existing marketing practice, the closest parallel is the A.C. Neilsen Company’s practice 
of collecting data on consumers’ television viewing habits.  Such tracking only takes 
place by invitation.  See Nielsen Media Research, What if Nielsen TV Ratings Contacts 
Me?, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com (2002). 
 81. Posner suggested that the law does not always require the “shrewd bargainer” 
to disclose to the other party to the transaction the facts of the bargainer’s true opinion of 
the value of the transaction.  He suggested that this shrewdness does at one point cross 
the line into fraud.  The line is crossed, according to Posner, when the information that a 
party seeks to conceal is not a product of significant investment.  Richard A. Posner, The 
Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397–98 (1978). 
 82. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 74, at 755–62.  Paul Schwartz saw a risk to 
democratization of opportunity by a restriction of economic and information 
opportunity by means of profiling in its reinforcement of existing prejudices and 
mistaken beliefs.  Id. at 757.  Schwartz also predicted a substantial restriction of 
autonomous decisionmaking as a result of the oppressive force of constant surveillance.  
Id. at 758–59 (“The threat to autonomy is through a coercive influence that takes over, or 
subtly and persistently colonizes, a person’s thinking process.”). 
 83. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 26–27. 
 84. Id.  First Union National Bank uses a similar ranking system called “Einstein.”  
It uses colors instead of letter grades.  Marginal customers are accorded a red ranking.  
Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Lamont, supra note 53.  This theory is commonly known as the “Pareto 
Principle,” so named after Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian economist and sociologist who 
postulated the theory.  See Don Bauder, Blame That Troublesome 20% for 80% of the 
Problems, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 9, 2001, at H2.  Pareto was branded a fascist 
for supporting a theory of the superiority of the elite by virtue of his statement that 
twenty percent of the people will always control eighty percent of the wealth.  Id. 
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identify their most profitable customers and to “fire” their unprofitable, 
or even less profitable, customers.87  Furthermore, it is not beyond the 
imagination to expect that a customer who has been fired might also 
have that fact reflected in (or otherwise inferable from) their profile that 
is sold to the data co-op market.88  The net effect is likely to be less 
access and less financial choice for the economically disadvantaged who 
either earn a marginal profile by virtue of their socioeconomic status or 
who do not produce high profit margins for a financial institution.89 
These exclusionary decisions may be made on the basis of inaccurate 
assumptions.  Far from being scientific,90 the decisions generated by 
profiling technology may actually be discriminatory.91  In fact, in the 
context of profiling by financial services, profiling may simply be a new 
and insidious legal form of discrimination that merely automates old-
fashioned redlining practices.92  Because the criteria used for profiling 
decisions are often hidden inside the “black box” of a neural network or 
other computer self-learning algorithm,93 the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (ECOA),94 which strictly prohibits discriminatory lending practices, 
 
 87. In the words of one banking software developer, “Not all customers are created 
equal.”  Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 28. 
 88. This is the flip side of what is now occurring with regard to high-value 
customers who are being “bought and sold like derivative securities.”  Id. at EB 29. 
 89. See Balvinder S. Sangha, Online Lending Brings with It Issues of Equal Credit 
Access, AM. BANKER, March 16, 2001, at 17. 
 90. The assumptions made by computer profiling technology can be inscrutable.  
See, e.g., Sandra Martin, Is Little Brother Watching You?, THE GLOBE AND MAIL REP. ON 
BUS. MAG., Aug. 25, 2000, at 70 (observing that Amazon.com decided author Simson 
Garfinkel was interested in erotic lesbian films based on his prior purchase of online 
women’s literature and his browsing of books on computer networking), available at 
http://www.robmagazine.com/servlet/ GIS.Servlets.HTMLTemplate?tf=robm. 
 91. See Sangha, supra note 89.  Whereas banks have historically offered equal 
rates for financing to all customers who met acceptable credit standards, the “risk based” 
pricing that transaction profiling brings will mean unaffordable financial products for 
some high risk consumers.  Higher risk scores will be given to certain demographic 
groups, which may cause systematic pricing differentials that are racially defined.  Id.  
Neural networks are known for making generalizations that are not contextually defined 
and thus could produce inapposite conclusions that exceed the most egregious form of 
traditional discrimination.  See LAUDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 493 (“[I]t thinks 
everything in the shape of a car is a car, even if the shape is a paper cutout!”). 
 92. See ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 13. 
 93. Professor Joel Reidenberg of Fordham University remarked about the microprofiles 
created by value assumptions generated by self-learning neural networks: “Some of this really 
crosses the line into offensiveness.”  Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 33. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000) (prohibiting the use of information relating to sex, race, 
color, religion, national origin, age, or marital status for purposes of making discriminatory 
credit decisions). 
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may be effectively skirted with probable impunity.95  This is due to the 
fact that under the new one-to-one marketing regime in use by financial 
institutions, a consumer unfortunate enough to possess a profile that 
produces a substandard score from the predictive black box would be 
discriminated against not in the context of a credit denial per se, but 
rather by virtue of a marketing decision by the financial institution to 
either withhold the offer entirely from the consumer or to price the offer 
unfavorably, thus providing a disincentive to a consumer’s acceptance of 
the financial product offering.96  Because the decisions based on profiles 
are inscrutable even to the developers of the profiling software,97 it 
would be difficult if not nearly impossible for the wronged consumer to 
prove that the criteria utilized in a decision generated by a black box was 
in fact discriminatory under the ECOA.98 
These social effects are all the more disturbing when one considers 
that the data used to profile consumers may simply be wrong or 
outdated.99  If the error rate in data utilized by the credit reporting 
agencies is any guideline, the error rate may be as high as forty-three 
percent.100  Consumers have little opportunity to discover or correct 
these errors.  Unlike the right of review and correction for consumer 
credit reports, which is codified under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA),101 consumers currently have no notice of adverse decisions 
made on the basis of their transaction profiles, no mechanism to see their 
profiles to audit for errors, and no right of correction for erroneous 
 
 95. According to Dierdre Mulligan, staff counsel at the Center for Democracy & 
Technology, it is extremely hard to prove discrimination resulting from the use of 
personal information.  Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal 
Info.  What’s in it for You?, BUS. WK., April 5, 1999, at 84. 
 96. For example, consider a profile showing an individual who lives in a zip code 
classified as low income and predominantly minority, subscribes to a women’s 
magazine, does not have a joint checking account, and regularly contributes to the local 
African Methodist Episcopal church.  If this person is accordingly assigned a high risk 
score by a predictive computer model that determines that these data points are 
undesirable, and she is thus offered credit at prohibitively high rates or not advised of the 
availability of a suitable financial product at all, that (possibly legal) decision would 
likely have the substantially similar net effect as would an illegal denial of credit 
resulting from discriminatory redlining that was based specifically and demonstratively 
on the fact that she was a single, black female. 
 97. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 30 (stating that scientists cannot vouch for 
the accuracy of conclusions nor can they determine how the technology reached any 
particular conclusion). 
 98. Some have remarked about the dearth of legislative and regulatory guidance on 
the subject of when risk based pricing and other decisions taken on the basis of profiling 
constitute an ECOA violation.  See Sangha, supra note 89. 
 99. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 299. 
 100. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or 
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 212 (1992). 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).  For a discussion of the FCRA, see infra notes 197–
211 and accompanying text. 
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data.102  And by some accounts, banks may be relying less on consumer 
credit reports from the credit reporting agencies to support their 
consumer lending decisions, relying instead on their available 
transaction profiles.103 
Although it is reasonable to price financial products differentially 
according to objective risk based on a consumer’s credit report, payment 
history, or other factors with a direct and substantial link to credit risk, 
that is distinguishable from the practice of pricing financial products by 
means of predictive assumptions made by computer models based on 
attenuated generalizations deduced from randomly aggregated transaction 
patterns.  The information revolution is likely to produce a structure 
where the disadvantaged receive less service, less choice, and less 
attractive terms for financial products due to discriminatory practices 
hidden in the guise of low profile scores.104  The economic impacts of 
profiling are likely to further aggravate this situation. 
B.  Economic Effects: Pareto Optimal Efficiency                                            
or Market Failure? 
Increased profiling and data sharing practices will modify the balance 
of power within the financial services industry.  Financial industry 
spokespersons have argued that information sharing in financial services 
is critically necessary to allow small financial institutions to obtain a 
greater cache of data from marketing partners to enable them to better 
compete with the larger financial holding companies.105  However, the 
 
 102. The FCRA explicitly excludes “experience information” and any information 
disclosed among affiliated entities from the definition of a consumer credit report.  Thus 
this type of data is not subject to provisions in the FCRA concerning transparency, 
notice, and restrictions on use of consumer credit reports.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1681a(d)(2)(A) (2000). 
 103. See H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY 25–27 (1994).  This practice does not 
make the bank a consumer reporting agency subject to regulation under the FCRA.  See 
infra note 199. 
 104. As one letter writer to Business Week magazine stated the issue: “[P]ersonal 
information will be used to discriminate against the less successful, less healthy, or 
otherwise less commercially desirable among us. . . .  How many companies won’t be 
financed on the founder’s credit cards because the cards weren’t issued in the first 
place?”  Readers Report, “Weblining” Could Sideline Would-Be Entrepreneurs, BUS. 
WK., April 24, 2000, at 14 (letter of David Raab). 
 105. The GLBA’s purpose was to facilitate the affiliation of banks, insurance 
companies, and other financial services companies.  See H.R. REP NO. 106-434, at 145 
(1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 246.  The GLBA’s adherents indicated that the 
legislation would enable smaller financial institutions to compete with larger entities 
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increased information sharing and resultant profiling that is now allowed 
under the GLBA106 is just as likely to create extreme competitive 
imbalances between the small financial institutions and the large 
financial holding companies.  Smaller institutions rely on their ability to 
serve niche markets to achieve profitability.107  However, the increased 
customer segmentation that will be possible with profiling may allow the 
larger financial holding companies to cut into those traditional niche 
markets that smaller institutions have traditionally served.108  Thus, 
instead of helping the smaller institutions to compete with the much 
larger financial holding companies, the information sharing practices 
allowed under the GLBA may actually serve to cripple the smaller 
financial institutions.  And small community banks and thrifts generally 
serve the less affluent or more rural portions of society.109 
In addition to changing the competitive structure of the financial 
services industry, profiling alters the economic balance between the 
individual consumer and the financial institution.110  By profiling 
consumers, financial institutions can predict an individual’s demand and 
price point sensitivity111 and thus can alter the balance of power in their 
price and value negotiations with that individual.  Statistics indicate that 
the power shift facilitated by predictive profiling has proven highly 
 
with affiliates, perhaps because of the power granted them to share data with unaffiliated 
third parties.  See 145 CONG. REC. E2237 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1999) (statement of Hon. 
James Leach) (“The power under the act will provide community banks a credible basis 
to compete with financial institutions of any size or any specialty and in addition to offer, 
in similar ways, services that new entrants into financial markets, such as Internet or 
computer software companies, may originate.”). 
 106. For a description of the information sharing provisions of the GLBA, see infra 
notes 212–31 and accompanying text. 
 107. Robert W. Dixon, Note, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization 
Act: Why Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act’s 
Projected Effects on Community Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 671, 672–75 (2001). 
 108. The move to Internet banking and other Web-based customer interfaces will 
further aggravate this trend.  Forrester Research says that twenty-three percent of 
companies are already using the Net to “micro-segment” their customers.  See Stepanek, 
supra note 59, at EB 29. 
 109. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S13876 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Hagel); Dixon, supra note 107, at 674–75. 
 110. Companies are able to keep what amounts to a dynamic profit and loss 
statement on their customers.  See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 28.  Forrester 
Research suggests that customers will be bought and sold “like derivative securities.”  Id.  
Some comments submitted to the FTC expressed the view that the targeting of 
consumers by profiling is manipulative.  See ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 
10, at 14. 
 111. RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 43 (referring to this as “the great value shift,” 
which will affect pricing as well as the value of what is sold).  Some have suggested that 
this information imbalance could constitute a deceptive trade practice under consumer 
protection laws.  See Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices 
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2001). 
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profitable for the financial services industry.112  However, there is little 
evidence that indicates that any of these profits or cost savings are being 
passed on to consumers.  For this reason, and because most consumers 
have no practical ability to negotiate price terms for the exchange of 
their data, many characterize the commercial exploitation of consumer 
transaction data as a classic example of a market failure.113 
Some have suggested correcting this market failure by creating a 
consumer’s property right in their transaction data, thereby creating the 
basis for a market where data can be traded for value like any other 
commodity.114  Proponents of this solution cite the resultant market 
efficiency benefits of an economy blessed by the ideal of classic 
economic theory: perfect efficiency based on perfect knowledge.115  
However, others suggest that due to valuation difficulties and the 
unequal bargaining positions between consumers and corporations, a 
property rights approach to personal information would create a market 
failure of even greater dimensions than what currently exists.116  In 
 
 112. See Stepanek, supra note 59, at EB 32.  Profiling enabled Sanwa Bank to 
realize productivity increases amounting to fourteen percent in one year, First Union saw 
an eighteen percent increase in one year.  Visa International saves millions of dollars 
annually from its risk analysis technology.  Id. at EB 28.  The financial industry has the 
highest return of investment on a data warehouse, at close to twenty-five percent.  INT’L. 
DATA CORP., supra note 43, at 9 fig.1. 
 113. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal 
Paradigm?  Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) 
(“[T]he company internalizes the gains from using the information but can externalize 
some of the losses and so has a systematic incentive to overuse it.”) (quoting PETER P. 
SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998)); Paul M. Schwartz, supra 
note 74, at 763 (a bilateral monopoly).  But see RAPP & MARTIN, supra note 6, at 42 
(suggesting that profiling is simply a self-defense response by business to the ever 
increasing competitive pressures that have resulted from the growing ability of 
consumers to access instant data about a product’s features, price, and value). 
 114. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 14, at 160–63. 
 115. See id.  For the classic discussion of economic theory as it relates to liability 
rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  Under 
Pareto-optimal market theory, “[i]t is the capacity of the market to induce disclosure of 
individual preferences which makes it theoretically possible for the market to bring about 
exchanges leading to Pareto optimality.”  Id. at 1095 n.13. 
 116. See Schwartz, supra note 74, at 763–76 (arguing against the use of a market 
solution based in property rights in data to provide consumers with control over their 
data).  Schwartz feared that the commodification of personal data will result in a bilateral 
monopoly producing contracts of adhesion of a new dimension and a resultant market 
failure of monumental proportions.  Id. at 763.  See generally Samuelson, supra note 113 
(arguing that a licensing approach rooted in trade secrecy law is superior to a property 
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addition, any scheme based on property rights necessarily encourages 
alienability,117 and thus rather than discouraging the commercial 
exploitation of a person’s identity, establishment of property rights in 
transaction data would likely have the effect of encouraging this 
exploitation by establishing the financial institution’s ownership to any 
and all data that a consumer provided to it for purposes of a commercial 
transaction.  In short, a property rights regime would set in motion a 
significant transfer of economic and market power to the data collectors. 
Indeed, a theory creating a market for data seems improbable when 
one considers that the propertization and commodification of information 
actually turns classic economic theory on its head.118  Information, 
unlike tangible assets, resists any real codification under an economic 
theory of value, because it defies measurement, it is not easily divisible 
or appropriable,119 it typically is not subject to scarcity, it is not a thing 
that is owned by one party to the exclusion of another, it does not 
decrease in value with use, and it probably will not exhibit decreasing 
returns of marginal utility to scale.120  In addition, information is difficult 
to value because it often exhibits wide divergence between its value of 
use and its exchange value due to the fact that it does not respond to the 
rules of supply and demand.121  Market inefficiency results because a 
consumer is likely to part with his or her information for a much lower 
price than the actual value of the information to the data collector.122  
 
rights regime).  For an analysis of why a property rights theory would be unlikely to 
improve information privacy, see generally Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A 
New Legal Paradigm?  Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1283 (2000). 
 117. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 115, at 1092. 
 118. See Glazer, supra note 18, at 135. 
 119. One author suggests that commodifying digital information would make it an 
act of theft to exchange recipe ideas with a friend or neighbor, invalidating the theories 
of the progress of the arts and sciences that lie at the foundation of Enlightenment 
philosophy.  Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REV. 
237, 239 (1996). 
 120. Glazer, supra note 18, at 135–36. 
 121. See id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1461, 1502–03 (2000) (discussing how consumers underestimate the actual 
marginal value of their data because they are often unaware of the aggregate value of 
their profile); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 
830–34 (2000).  
The standard definition by economists of price discrimination is that under it a 
seller sets ‘different prices to different purchasers depending not on the costs 
of selling to them, . . . but on the elasticity of their demands for his product.’  
In contrast, privacy price discrimination involves a differentiation by data 
processing companies among individuals with varying preferences about the 
use of their personal data. 
Id. (quoting R. Posner). 
 122. Because consumers have little ability to either reduce the supply of their data 
or to increase the price, a “subsidy is given to those data processing companies that 
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And the data collector, if not forced to internalize the costs of a 
consumer’s privacy preferences, is likely to engage in wasteful behavior, 
such as increased marketing to consumers who do not desire to receive 
such offers.123 
Judge Posner analyzed privacy in economic terms and concluded that 
the high transaction costs associated with assigning property rights to 
individuals in their data suggest that information secrets should become 
the property of those to whom they are disclosed.124  However, Posner 
also suggested that this analysis is only valid where information privacy 
fills the role of an “intermediate good” and not the final good itself.125  
Posner suggested that where privacy becomes a final good, the economic 
analysis comes “to a grinding halt” because “tastes are unanalyzable from 
an economic standpoint.”126  But, the privacy interest in aggregated and 
profiled personal information cannot be looked at as merely an 
intermediate good, because the profile is no longer information per se, but 
instead is a marketable commodity.127  And not just any commodity, but a 
derivative work of personal information that contains the essence of self. 
 
exploit personal data.”  Schwartz, supra note 121, at 833. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Posner, supra note 81, at 398.  Courts considering whether a person has 
ownership of his biological information have arrived at a similar conclusion.  See Moore 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a patient did not 
have a conversion cause of action against his physician for use of his spleen cells to 
patent a cell line).  The few courts that have accorded property rights in biological 
information to the donor have only done so where a contract between the donor and 
recipient established a legal obligation toward a tangible thing of value similar to a 
bailment.  See Southeastern Fertility Ctr. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 99-1736, 2000 
WL 223339 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2000) (finding that sperm was personal property, and 
therefore, its destruction was excluded from coverage under the insurance policy 
exclusion for coverage of damage to the personal property of others in the care, custody, 
and control of the insured). 
 125. Posner, supra note 81, at 394 (“Under [the intermediate good] approach, 
people are assumed not to desire or value privacy or prying in themselves . . . .”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 243–53.  The concept of a derivative 
product of transaction information that encompasses and emulates the personality is not 
farfetched science fiction.  Technology increasingly enables the simulation of the persona, 
particularly the predictive agent technology that utilizes unstructured text in natural 
language.  Such technology enables a computer to read a large set of text messages to 
extract pertinent information into a machine-readable form.  “The profile could know every 
document you’ve ever read, every person you’ve ever known, every place you’ve ever 
been, and every word you’ve ever said that has been recorded.  Your identity would no 
longer exist just inside of you, but in the model.”  Id. at 252.  As an example of this, a 
computer program was developed at Yale University that emulated the personality of Cyrus 
Vance, responded to questions as if from his memory, and “thought of itself as Vance.”  Id. 
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 Concerns over the potential ramifications of corporate ownership of 
these derivatives of personality and the potentially disturbing socioeconomic 
effects of profiling have driven many legal scholars to search for a legal 
solution to regulate or otherwise control the practice.128  But the search 
for a legal oasis of privacy protection in U.S. common law and statutory 
authority has unfortunately led most to a destination resembling a 
waterless desert.129 
IV.  THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE U.S. 
“[T]hese are the business records of the banks.”130 
Privacy is an ancient concept.  The inviolate right of a person to a 
protected zone of privacy that cannot be invaded by the outside world is 
traceable in the earliest codification of the laws of western civilization.  
The Code of Hammurabi provided the death penalty for any “breach into 
a house.”131  The Mosaic Law provides that no man may enter into his 
neighbor’s house to collect a pledge for a debt, but rather requires that 
the creditor must wait outside for the debtor to collect the pledge from 
inside the house and bring it out to his creditor.132  Under Roman law the 
 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 253 (suggesting that it may be necessary to utilize the doctrine 
of compilation copyright to protect against the “extraction of self”); Ann Bartow, Our 
Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 704 
(2000) (suggesting property rights in data combined with reverse click wrap 
agreements); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000) (arguing for a fundamental right of 
information privacy grounded in autonomy); Susan M. Giles, Promises Betrayed: 
Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 52–84 
(1995) (analyzing the use of the breach of confidence tort for protecting privacy, and 
concluding it would be unconstitutional); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information 
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1313 (2000) (concluding that a legislative solution is 
the best answer, but that any legislation will be watered down by special interest groups); 
Reidenberg, supra note 100, at 236–43 (arguing for the implementation of some coherent 
and consistent privacy rights in the U.S., but warning that any general U.S. scheme to 
protect privacy will need to incorporate a more flexible administrative mechanism to 
avoid the implementation problems seen in Europe); Francis S. Chalpowski, Note, The 
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 158–59 (1991) 
(arguing for a constitutional right rooted in Lockean property rights). 
 129. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 121, at 1543 (“There is no magic bullet, no 
panacea.  If the privacy pessimists are to be proved wrong, the great diversity of new 
privacy-destroying technologies will have to be met with a legal and social response that 
is at least as subtle and multifaceted as the technological challenge.”). 
 130. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). 
 131. See 1 ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVOLUTION OF LAW 395 
(1915). 
 132. See Deuteronomy 24:10–11.  This principle is retained in the common law 
under which even a bailiff of the court is enjoined from entering a house to regain 
another’s property.  NELSON LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
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hearth and home was accorded the status of a sanctuary from any 
invader and any person entering the home of another—even to serve a 
summons—was guilty of invasion of privacy.133  The concept of Roman 
Injuria also reached beyond the protections of hearth and home to 
include the protection of the personality and reputation.  Thus, the 
Injuria of Roman law criminalized the action of shouting until a crowd 
gathered around an individual as well as the act of following an honest 
woman or young boy or girl.134 
The expression “a man’s home is his castle” predates English 
jurisprudence,135 but certainly in feudal Britain, identity, self-worth and 
legal protection were directly linked to the land and the baronial 
estate.136  As such, feudal society came to link the concept of protection 
from the invasions of the outside world as well as the concept of identity 
with the concept of real property.137 
Perhaps upon a feudal basis linking identity with the notion of real 
property estates, Locke, Hume, Bentham, and others developed the 
Enlightenment theories of law based on proprietary rights and those 
rights’ relationship to freedom and the inviolate self, which were the 
 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13–15 (1970), reprinted in RICHARD 
C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (1999). 
 133. See PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND METHODS, supra note 132, at 7–8; see also 
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905) (discussing the 
history of the right to privacy). 
 134. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 71; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 n.1 (1890) (“Injuria, in the narrower sense, is 
every intentional and illegal violation of honour, i.e., the whole personality of another.” 
(quoting SALKOWSKI, ROMAN LAW 668–69 n.2 (n.d.)). 
 135. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223 
(1877) (“[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a 
man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with 
impunity: agreeing herein with the sentiments of ancient Rome.”). 
 136. See Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603) (“[T]he house of 
every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and 
violence, as for his repose.”) (citation omitted). 
 137. The close identification of real property rights with identity can be seen in the 
incidence of sumptuary laws in Renaissance Britain.  The disintegration of the feudal 
system and the dislocation from the land and resulting problems with loss of identity 
among the feudal classes may have been at least partly to blame for the incidence of 
these laws which were instituted in Renaissance Britain in an attempt to prevent the 
common classes from impersonating the nobility.  See Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My 
Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain—with an 
Example From the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392, 
1423 n.139 (1993).  Pollack analogizes historical sumptuary laws to today’s protection of 
proprietary rights under trademark law.  Id. at 1422–28. 
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primary sources of the United States constitutional tradition.138 
A.  The Constitutional Basis for Financial Privacy 
The right in one’s own person or persona could be said to be the very 
foundation of the political system of the United States.139  John Locke 
expressed his concept of the inviolate self: “Though the earth, and all 
inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in 
his own person.  This nobody has any right to but himself.”140  This right 
most often is categorized as a right of privacy in the United States legal 
tradition.141  However, the term “privacy” may be an unfortunate 
nomenclature due to its common linkage with secrecy or facts that 
should be kept hidden.  The right of privacy in personal information 
actually has very little to do with hiding things, but is instead about a 
foundational right of inviolate personality and about the autonomy and 
integrity that stems from that right.142  Laurence Tribe expressed this 
concept as the “preservation of ‘those attributes of an individual which 
are irreducible in his selfhood.’”143  The protection of the privacy right 
finds its source in a constitutive right rooted in autonomy and the 
protection of a zone of privacy that cannot be invaded by the outside 
world without an individual’s express consent.144 
The most obvious articulation of the protection of the zone of privacy 
accorded to hearth and home is in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of 
protection from unlawful search and seizure.145  A critical test of the 
 
 138. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
101–05, 183–87 (1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1310 & 
n.16 (1988); cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“[A] 
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the 
personal right in property.  Neither could have meaning without the other.”). 
 139. See ALAN BRIAN CARTER, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 13 (1989). 
 140. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed., J.M. 
Dent 1993) (1690).  Locke’s self-evident natural rights were not expressly incorporated 
into the Constitution by its framers, but some have indicated that this omission was 
merely because the founding fathers deemed these rights so obvious that they did not 
consider them necessary to include.  See TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1309–10.  Early drafts 
of the Bill of Rights did expressly incorporate natural rights into the Constitution.  Id. at 
1310 n.14. 
 141. See TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1302–08. 
 142. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 4. 
 143. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1304 (quoting Paul A. Freund, Address at the 
American Law Institute 52nd Annual Meeting (May 23, 1975)). 
 144. Perhaps the best expression of this concept is crystallized in Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s statement that privacy is simply “the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”  Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 145. U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
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scope of the Fourth Amendment came to pass with the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of the case of Olmstead v. United States.146  Olmstead 
revealed the Court’s struggle with information privacy issues inherent in 
the impact on society of new telecommunication technologies as well as 
with how the constitutional protections of human rights related to these new 
technologies.  Olmstead specifically concerned the issue of wiretapping and 
whether the government’s interception of a telephone conversation 
constituted an unlawful search and seizure.  Unfortunately, instead of 
adapting the spirit of the law to the challenges of new applications, the 
Court retreated into formalism.147  Thus, the majority of the Court held 
that because no physical entry of the house was necessary to accomplish 
interception of a phone conversation, and because the information was 
obtained by the sense of hearing and not by any actual physical entry, 
wiretapping did not constitute any violation of the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee against unlawful search and seizure.148  Justice Brandeis wrote 
a seminal dissent,149 carrying with him Justices Holmes, Stone and 
Butler.  Brandeis expressed the importance of adapting the constitutional 
guarantees to changing technology150 in prescient terms: 
 In the application of a constitution, therefore our contemplation cannot be 
only of what has been but of what may be. . . .  
 . . .  Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of 
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. . . .  Can it be that the 
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual 
security?151 
Justice Brandeis went on to assert that the framers of the Constitution, in 
recognition of man’s spiritual nature, feelings, and intellect, conferred 
upon the citizens of the United States “the right to be let alone—the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”152  Although formalism carried the day, the dissent carried history 
 
violated.”). 
 146. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 147. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 338–39 (1967) (concluding that the 
law did not catch up with the technological advances of the early twentieth century until 
the late 1950s). 
 148. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466, overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). 
 149. Id. at 471–85. 
 150. Id. at 473–79. 
 151. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 373 (1910)). 
 152. Id. at 478. 
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as well as the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Later, in Katz 
v. United States,153 the Warren Court overruled Olmstead and required 
that government wiretaps meet the procedural requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment, including the requirement for prior judicial 
approval.154 
However, since the Court’s general recognition in Katz of the 
Constitution’s protection of a basic zone of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment,155 information privacy rights have undergone gradual 
erosion.  A major decision weakening the protection for information 
privacy was United States v. Miller.156  In Miller, the Court held that an 
individual has no legitimate “expectation of privacy” in the checks and 
deposit slips that are disclosed to a bank in the course of the business 
relationship.  The Court further stated that these transaction records were 
accorded no protection from search and seizure because they were 
voluntarily disclosed, were negotiable instruments and thus not 
confidential communications, and furthermore were deemed “the 
business records of the bank.”157  The Court indicated, however, that the 
requirement for disclosure to governmental authorities did not abrogate 
the pre-existing duty of the bank to ensure that the customer’s financial 
information will “be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the [bank] will not be betrayed.”158 
A further dilution of the constitutional protection of information 
privacy occurred with the Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland.159  In 
Smith, the Court concluded that the police may utilize a pen register in 
 
 153. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 154. Id. at 358–59. 
 155. Id. at 351 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”). 
 156. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 157. Id. at 440–43.  Because Miller permitted unlimited government access to 
financial records, Congress reacted by enacting the Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2000), to set limits on government’s free access.  However, the 
scope of the Act is limited to controlling the disclosure of a consumer’s financial 
information to the federal government and does not establish any limits on disclosure to 
private entities.  See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 262.  The states are 
therefore left with the responsibility to regulate any disclosures of financial information 
to the private sector as well as to state and local governments.  See L. RICHARD FISCHER, 
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 5-2 (1983).  However, a recent Supreme Court decision 
indicates that Congress is vested with the primary responsibility to regulate data privacy 
under the Commerce Clause.  See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (reasoning 
that data is a thing in interstate commerce).  Because most state constitutions roughly 
parallel the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution with reference to search and 
seizure jurisprudence, state constitutions generally protect only against disclosure of 
personal information to governmental entities and do not concern themselves with 
disclosure of personal financial information to the private sector.  FISCHER, supra, at 5-3 
to 5-7. 
 158. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.  See also infra note 258. 
 159. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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recording calls made by an individual without invoking the Fourth 
Amendment guarantees against search and seizure.160  The Court 
reasoned that unlike the telephone conversation itself, which is accorded 
Fourth Amendment protection, because the telephone numbers are 
voluntarily disclosed to and recorded by the phone company for billing 
purposes, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
numbers dialed.161  The Court further stated that the caller assumes the 
risk that the telephone company will disclose this information to the 
police.162  This decision effectively stands for the proposition that  
consumers have no expectation of privacy from government intrusion 
into their transaction data that is voluntarily disclosed in a commercial 
transaction.  Legal scholars have criticized the Court’s approach to data 
privacy as not appreciating the potentially invasive uses to which 
transaction data could be put.163  Whether the Court will modify its 
position regarding a consumer’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
or her transaction data in light of the increasingly invasive potential of 
new technologies remains to be seen.164  But, under the current Fourth 
 
 160. Id. at 742. 
 161. Id. at 742–44. 
 162. Id.  The Court’s conception of “assumption of risk” is based on the theory that 
the consumer chooses to disclose information, and by this choice, forfeits any 
expectation of privacy that may have existed in this information.  Laurence Tribe called 
this the “assumption of broadcast” notion and expressed the opinion that it is impossible 
to say that one has “assumed” a risk of surveillance where one has no other choice but to 
do so, based on the fact that it is not feasible to live without a telephone or a bank 
account.  TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1391–92. 
 163. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1390–92.  Tribe stated: “The Court’s 
counter-intuitive understanding of ‘assumed risks’ generates a terribly crabbed sense of 
the contemporary possibilities for privacy.”  Id. at 1391. 
 164. A recent Supreme Court decision may indicate the Court’s willingness to 
expand the reasonable expectation of privacy principle to cover information obtained by 
new forms of invasive technology.  In Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia expanded the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures to apply to 
surveillance by means of infrared heat detection sensors.  Overruling the lower court 
decision that held that the defendant had not revealed any intimate details of the 
plaintiffs home, the Court held that all details in the home are deemed intimate details.  
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).  Moreover, the Court concluded that the 
“homeowner [should not be left] at the mercy of advancing technology.”  Id. at 35–36.  
Although the real impact of Kyllo is still unclear, some have suggested that the decision 
may bode well for such an expansion of the protection of information privacy against 
invasions, public and private.  See, e.g., William Safire, Privacy Still Under Attack, N. 
COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), June 22, 2001, at A-14 (commenting on Kyllo: “The Supreme 
Court’s reaffirmation of the individual’s right to privacy is heartening news to citizens who 
want to maintain personal control of their medical, financial and academic records, their 
buying habits, their genetic makeup and other intimate details of their lives.”). 
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Amendment jurisprudence, the protection of information privacy against 
government invasions remains somewhat anemic. 
However, the true constitutional protections of information privacy as it 
relates to computer profiling by governmental entities may arise not out of 
the Fourth Amendment, but rather out of the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
guarantee of due process.  The Court’s approach to the issue of computer 
profiling may be discerned from the opinion rendered in California Bankers 
Ass’n v. Shultz.165  In California Bankers Ass’n, the plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 that required banks to 
maintain certain records on their customers’ transactions, as well as to 
report any transactions in currency that exceeded $10,000.166  The Court 
upheld the Act without reaching any First, Fourth or Fifth Amendment 
claims.167  However, the Court expressed in dicta that more difficult 
constitutional questions would be raised in any information-gathering 
program that expanded the scope of transaction data to include information 
that would “reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and 
beliefs.”168  The Court has given other indications that future technological 
encroachments on privacy may be met with a more forcible constitutional 
challenge, including questions of violations of due process rights.  Justice 
Brennan expressed this view in his dissent in Whalen v. Roe,169 where he 
stated: “The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data 
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not 
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity 
of some curb on such technology.”170 
The Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest may also guarantee a right 
of associational privacy and the inviolate right to “shape the ‘self’ that one 
presents to the world, and on the basis of which the world in turn shapes 
one’s existence.”171  This constitutive right was articulated by the Court in 
 
 165. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). 
 166. Id. at 78. 
 167. Id. at 46–47. 
 168. Id. at 78–79 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 169. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 170. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Laurence Tribe has also expressed the 
potential of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide protection against invasive profiling 
technologies as follows: 
In an information-dense technological era, when living inevitably entails 
leaving not just information footprints but parts of one’s self in myriad 
directories, files, records and computers, to hold that the fourteenth 
amendment does not reserve to individuals some power to say when and how 
and by whom that information and those confidences are to be used would be 
to denigrate the central role that information autonomy must play in any 
developed concept of the self. 
TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1400. 
 171. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1389–90; see also David H. Flaherty, On the Utility 
of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831, 
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Whalen v. Roe172 as the basic human right to withhold information that 
one does not wish to share with others.173  The court expanded upon this 
aspect of the liberty interest in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.174  In 
Roberts, the Court indicated that the attributes surrounding intimate 
associations—marriage, family, childbirth, and the raising and education 
of children—are protected from intrusion as an element of personal 
liberty.175  The Fourteenth Amendment may therefore afford some 
protection against profiling activities that are found to implicate these 
subjects.176 
Although it is axiomatic that the Constitution applies solely with 
respect to invasions to personhood by the government and not by the 
private sector,177 the right of inviolate personality is still entitled to 
recognition as a basic tenet of our constitutional system by virtue of the 
states’ enforcement of individual rights under the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.178  This implied constitutive right of privacy is evidenced 
by the Court’s protection of harm to reputation under state law in the 
face of a First Amendment challenge.179  Case law has further developed 
this concept of linkage between the common law right of privacy and 
 
839–41 (1991). 
 172. 429 U.S. 589 (1970). 
 173. Id. at 599–600.  Laurence Tribe characterized this concept as one aspect of the 
aspiration to be the “master of the identity one creates in the world.”  TRIBE, supra note 
138, at 1304. 
 174. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 175. Id. at  619–20; see also United States v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (finding an expectation of privacy in detailed 
computerized records and stating that: “[B]oth the common law and the literal 
understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning 
his or her person”). 
 176. See Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Mass. 1987): 
[I]t is not just the right to a silent, solitary autonomy which is threatened by 
electronic surveillance: It is the right to bring thoughts and emotions forth from 
the self in company with others doing likewise, the right to be known to others 
and to know them, and thus to be whole as a free member of a free society. 
 177. See, e.g.,  TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1306 (stating that governmental coercion 
is accorded express constitutional limitations because it is viewed differently than the 
“passive, incremental coercion that shapes all of life and for which no one bears precise 
responsibility”). 
 178. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (“[T]he protection of a 
person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the 
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual 
States.”) (citations omitted); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (“The 
protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.”). 
 179. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1396 n.42 (collecting cases). 
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constitutional guarantees by grafting the Fourth Amendment “expectation 
of privacy” principle onto the privacy intrusion torts.180  Because the 
rights enforced by the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are 
rooted in the basic constitutional protections, any strengthening or 
expansion of a constitutional right in information privacy by the Court is 
likely to produce an equivalent level of protection of information privacy 
by the states with reference to private sector actions.  Conversely, any 
reticence by the Court to extend constitutional protection to information 
privacy is likely to be reflected in the lower courts’ unwillingness to 
extend similar protections in their interpretations of the common law and in 
legislatures’ unwillingness to expand the statutory protection of information 
privacy.181 
B.  The Legislative Basis for Financial Privacy 
The United States was the birthplace of the Code of Fair Information 
Practices182 that were later the basis for Organization for Economic 
 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (“One who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private 
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”); see also Nader v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 773 (N.Y. 1970) (comparing the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment to common law privacy torts); State v. Brooks, 601 A.2d 963, 969 
(Vt. 1991) (comparing tort law privacy intrusion concepts to a search and seizure case).  
See generally PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND METHODS, supra note 132, at  80–81 (1999) 
(discussing the linkages between tort and constitutional protection for information 
privacy). 
 181. Fred Cate, Director of the Information Law and Commerce Institute at the 
Indiana University School of Law, insists that the Supreme Court is unlikely to support 
the constitutionality of legislation requiring opt-in consent from consumers prior to use 
of their personal transaction data because of “significant” First Amendment issues.  
Senate Chairman Charts Legislation to Provide Privacy Opt-In, Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(CCH) No. 1921, at 1–2 (July 20, 2001).  This viewpoint necessarily assumes a premise 
that consumers have no underlying tort action based on a reasonable expectation of 
privacy against the disclosure of that data to the private sector.  Recognition of such an 
underlying cause of action would possibly change the analysis.  See U.S. West v. Fed. 
Communications Comm’n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1245 (10th Cir. 1999) (“When the 
fundamental right to privacy clashes with the right of free expression, the interest in 
privacy does not play second fiddle when the speech is merely intended to propose a 
commercial transaction.” (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Curtis v. 
Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also infra note 305. 
 182. The Code of Fair Information Practices is based on the following five 
principles: 
(1)   There must be no personal data-record-keeping systems whose very existence  
is secret. 
(2)   There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him  
is in a record and how it is used. 
(3)   There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that  
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other 
purposes without his consent. 
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Cooperation and Development guidelines183 that have since been 
codified in the European Commission Directive on Data Protection.184  
However, in contrast to the welcome adoption of the Fair Information 
Practices in Europe,185 the general U.S. legislative scheme for data 
privacy rights does not conform uniformly to these guidelines.186  
Instead of being unified under one data protection statute, information 
privacy is protected in the U.S. by sectoral-specific statutes containing 
inconsistent criteria for notice, choice, transparency, access, and security.187  
Examples of this are the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998 (COPPA),188 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA),189 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,190 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,191 the Video Privacy Protection Act 
 
(4)   There must be away for an individual to correct or amend a record of  
identifiable information about him. 
(5)   Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of  
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their 
intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED 
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS xx-xxi (1973). 
 183. See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. No 
C(80)58 (final), 1981 I.L.M. 422 (Sept. 23, 1980). 
 184. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, T.S. No. 108, 1981 I.L.M. 317. 
 185. Simson Garfinkel theorizes that the reason the Health, Education and Welfare 
report was adopted so readily in Europe during the 1970s was because of Europe’s desire 
not to repeat their relatively recent experiences with Nazi Germany.  See GARFINKEL, 
supra note 4, at 7.  Hitler’s schutzstaffel used data sourced from both the public and 
private sectors to round up suspects for incarceration.  Id. 
 186. For an analysis of the divergences between the U.S. protection of information 
privacy and that codified under the European Directive, see generally SCHWARTZ & 
REIDENBERG, supra note 6. 
 187. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 100, at 201 (“In the United States, however, 
no single source of privacy rights covers each data processing activity.  Informational 
privacy rights emerge from a complex web of federal and state laws that have responded 
to narrowly identified problems.”). 
 188. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2000). 
 189. On December 28, 2000, the Department of Health and Human Services set 
forth its final rule for standards for privacy of individually identifiable health 
information, implementing certain provisions of Title II of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.  The regulations are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 
160, 164 (2001). 
 190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3127 (2000). 
 191. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2000). 
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
 
978 
of 1980 (the “Bork Bill”)192 and the GLBA.  There are many difficulties 
with a sectoral approach.  Although placing different rules for protection 
of substantially similar data depending upon the industry sector of the 
data collector probably would survive an equal protection challenge, this 
approach may soon become unworkable and outmoded with the 
increasing convergence of the telecommunications sector, both internally 
and in combination with the financial services sector.193 
But apart from mere inconsistency, the U.S. statutory framework 
addressing information privacy lacks comprehensive force by focusing 
primarily on the issue of disclosure to third parties instead of focusing on 
the permissible uses of data.194  This differs fundamentally from the 
information privacy laws in Europe that set defined use restrictions on 
personal data and require the consumer’s express consent for any 
processing activities outside of the purpose for which the data was 
disclosed.195  As was suggested in Part II, intrusive invasions to privacy 
 
 192. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 107-209, approved Aug. 6, 
2002).  Under the Bork Bill, a consumer’s video viewing habits may not be disclosed 
without his or her express consent.  Id.; see also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 
6, at 314–15.  The bill obtained its nickname from the circumstances surrounding the 
unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court of Judge Robert Bork.  In an attempt to 
overturn Bork’s nomination, a Washington, D.C., newspaper journalist visited a local 
video store Bork frequented hoping to find “dirt.”  Instead of pornographic films, what 
turned up were 146 videos consisting mostly of Disney movies and Hitchcock films.  See 
GARFINKEL, supra note 4, at 72.  But perhaps other members of Congress had more to 
hide, as evidenced by their enthusiastic support of the opt-in provisions for information 
sharing or disclosure under this bill. 
 193. The problems that are likely to arise with the convergence of the industry are 
illustrated by the court’s interpretation of the Cable Act.  47 U.S.C. §§ 521–559 (West, 
WESTLAW through P.L. 107-209, approved Aug. 6, 2002).  See, e.g., Parker v. Time 
Warner Entm’t Co., No. 98 CV 4265 (ERK), 1999 WL 1132463 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 
1999).  Citing the legislative history of the Cable Act, the Parker court held that if a 
customer has not opted out of information disclosures, a cable operator is permitted to 
disclose only “that an individual subscribes to services.”  Id. at *9.  The cable operator is 
not permitted to “reveal the details of a particular transaction conducted over the cable 
system (such as bank-at-home or shop-at-home transaction)” even if the customer has 
not opted out.  Id.  However, under the GLBA, financial institutions are permitted to 
disclose customer experience information to third parties if they have notified their 
customers of this disclosure and the customer has not opted out of this disclosure.  
Although this inconsistency between the Cable Act and the GLBA would not be likely to 
invoke any equal protection issues (because these inconsistent regulations are arguably at 
least minimally rational), this structure is likely to set up a possible legal quagmire in 
determining which standard should apply if a financial holding company should ever 
merge with a cable company.  And, because the financial services industry is becoming 
more and more reliant on telecommunications to compete in the information economy, 
such a merger may not be unlikely. 
 194. For a review of data protection in the United States see generally, SCHWARTZ 
& REIDENBERG, supra note 6. 
 195. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 12–14.  The major difference 
between the European Union Convention and the United States’ data protection scheme 
is that the European Union focuses on the permitted uses of data as well as disclosure, 
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arising from computer profiling can take place without any actual 
disclosure of data to third parties, and harm to a consumer may result 
where a commercial entity internally uses a consumer’s profile to its 
own benefit and to the consumer’s detriment.  Thus, for legislation to be 
truly protective of information privacy, it must not only address 
disclosure, but must also set use restrictions precluding processing 
activities that exceed the scope of the initial purpose for which the data 
was disclosed or the scope of the consumer’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.196 
Financial privacy in the United States is dealt with under two major 
statutes:197 the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA),198 which 
governs the reporting of consumer credit information, and the GLBA, 
which sets forth the rules for information sharing between financial 
holding companies and their affiliates and other third parties. 
The purpose of the FCRA is to set forth guidelines and procedures for 
consumer reporting agencies with regard to their preparation and 
dissemination of consumer credit reports bearing on a consumer’s credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, 
personal characteristics, or mode of living, if that credit report is used or 
collected to serve as a factor in determining the consumer’s eligibility 
 
whereas the United States’ legislative scheme focuses solely on the disclosure of data.  
For example, the UK Data Protection Act 1998 provides, in part, that an individual is 
entitled to notify a data processor at any time to cease or not to begin processing any 
personal data of the data subject if that processing is “likely to cause substantial damage 
or substantial distress to him or to another, and . . . that damage or distress is or would be 
unwarranted.”  Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 § 10 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980029—b.htm. 
 196. For a discussion of the ambit of the consumer’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, see infra notes 158–164, 256–70 and accompanying text. 
 197. Three other statutes impact financial privacy.  The Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act of 1978 establishes the guidelines for dealings between consumers and financial 
institutions in connection with electronic fund transactions.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r 
(2000).  Although the Act sets forth the requirements for collection of transaction data 
and requires disclosures and the provision of account statements to consumers, it does 
not restrict the uses of that data nor does it restrict the disclosure of that data to third 
parties.  See also Reidenberg, supra note 100, at 214.  The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
also regulates financial privacy, to the extent that it regulates the use of data by 
prohibiting any use of information relating to sex, race, color, religion, national origin, 
age, or marital status for purposes of making discriminatory credit decisions.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1692b(2), 1692c(b) (2000).  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates 
disclosures of debtors’ financial information for debt collection purposes.  15 U.S.C. § 
1691(a)(1) (2000).  These statutes only tangentially relate to the practice of profiling and 
thus are not discussed in detail herein. 
 198. 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2000). 
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
 
980 
for household credit, insurance, or employment.  The FCRA only relates 
to disclosures of information by consumer reporting agencies and not to 
disclosures of financial information by banks, insurance companies, 
credit card companies, and the like.199  Unlike the other statutes addressing 
financial privacy, the FCRA sets defined restrictions on permissible uses 
of personal information.  Under the FCRA, a consumer credit report may 
be furnished by a consumer reporting agency to a third party only for 
limited purposes.200  Any subsequent use by a recipient of a consumer 
credit report is subject to strict guidelines for the use of that information 
which must be in accordance with a permissible purpose defined under 
the Act.201  But the standard of care that is required of the consumer 
reporting agencies is to put in place “reasonable procedures”202 so that 
consumer credit information is not disclosed for other than a permissible 
purpose.  The standard of care requires consumer reporting agencies to 
do “what a reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances.”203  
Under the FCRA, consumers are neither provided with notice of the 
collection and use of the data, nor are they provided with the opportunity 
to opt-out of the consumer reporting agencies’ collection and use.204  
 
 199. A “consumer reporting agency” means “any person which . . . regularly 
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer 
reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for 
the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2000).  
The term “consumer reporting agency” has been narrowly construed by the courts and as 
such does not include banks, credit card companies, or other financial entities that collect 
and disseminate information based solely on their own experiences with a consumer.  
See, e.g., Lema v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 935 F. Supp. 695, 697 (D. Md. 1996); Freeman 
v. S. Nat’l Bank, 531 F. Supp. 94, 95–96 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Nikou v. INB Nat’l Bank, 
638 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
 200. These purposes are: (1) in response to a court order, (2) in accordance with the 
consumer’s written instructions, or (3) to a person which it has reason to believe intends 
to use it: (i) in a credit transaction involving the consumer, (ii) for employment purposes, 
(iii) for the underwriting of insurance, (iv) for determination of eligibility for a license or 
other benefit of a governmental instrumentality, (v) as a potential investor or servicer, or 
current insurer or risk assessment of an existing credit obligation, or (vi) otherwise has a 
legitimate business need for the information.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2000).  However, 
the credit reporting agency is not subject to strict liability for failure to limit the 
furnishing of consumer reports to the permissible purposes.  Spence v. TRW, Inc., 92 
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1996).  The courts balance the potential harm of inaccuracy 
against the burden on the agency of safeguarding against such inaccuracy.  Houston v. 
TRW Info. Servs, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 689, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 201. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(e) (2000). 
 202. Id. § 1681e(a).  These reasonable procedures consist of requiring that users of 
the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is 
sought and to certify that it will be used for no other purpose.  Id. 
 203. Dobson v. Holloway, 828 F. Supp. 975, 977 (M.D. Ga. 1993). 
 204. A consumer is, however, able to opt-out of the so-called prescreening practices 
of the consumer reporting agencies.  The Act provides that a consumer reporting agency 
may furnish a consumer report to a third party that is not initiated by the consumer if the 
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Moreover, the FCRA does not provide for strict liability for errors 
contained in a consumer credit report, but merely imposes a duty of 
reasonable care.205  The FCRA does, however, provide the consumer 
with the opportunity to review his or her credit report and to correct any 
inaccurate information.206  The FCRA generally preempts any common 
law claims sounding in defamation, invasion of privacy or negligence, 
and provides qualified immunity for the consumer reporting agencies 
except where the agency furnishes false information with malice or 
willful intent to injure the consumer.207 
Thus, the FCRA gives consumers very limited rights pertaining to 
limiting profiling activities of their transaction information.  First, 
although the FCRA requires a consumer credit reporting agency to 
disclose the contents of a credit report to a consumer, the FCRA does not 
require disclosure to the consumer of the score that is generated by the 
agency’s computer model or of the criteria that the agency uses to arrive 
at that score.208  Second, the broadly-stated language of the FCRA 
establishing a permissible use for any “legitimate business need” has 
permitted the consumer reporting agencies, as well as recipients of the 
 
transaction consists of a “firm offer of credit or insurance.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1681b(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000).  A consumer may, however, opt-out of these disclosures by 
notifying the credit reporting agency that they do not consent to such disclosures to third 
parties.  Id. § 1681b(e).  Recently, the major consumer reporting agencies have 
established a central toll-free number that consumers may call to opt-out of these 
disclosures: 1.888.5OPTOUT.  See BANK OF AM. CORP., BANK OF AMERICA PRIVACY 
POLICY FOR CONSUMERS: HOW WE PROTECT AND USE INFORMATION (2001). 
 205. See Spence, 92 F.3d 380 at 383. 
 206. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2001). 
 207. 15 U.S.C § 1681h (2001).  The FTC is given the power to enforce the FCRA 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), id. § 41, and any violation of the 
FCRA will be deemed an unfair and deceptive act  under the FTC Act.  Id. § 1681s.  A 
private individual does not have the right to act as a private attorney general in enforcing 
the FCRA.  See Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 660, 668 (W.D. Pa. 1974). 
 208. The score is most often generated by a modeling technology licensed from 
Fair, Isaac and Company (FICO).  FICO has guarded the score as its proprietary 
information and only recently has provided customers the opportunity to obtain a copy of 
their score.  See Fair, Isaac and Company, Inc., myFICO—Your Source For Credit 
Scoring, at http://www.myfico.com (last visited May 24, 2002).  FICO will provide a 
copy of your score for a fee, currently $12.95.  Id.  FICO’s scoring methodology itself is 
not publicly available, but FTC materials indicate that some factors included in the score 
are age, income, residential status (own or rent), income, and debt ratio.  See Fair, Isaac 
and Company, Credit Scoring 101, Presentation to the Federal Trade Commission 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/creditscoring/present/sld001.htm, at slide 7 (July 22, 
1999). 
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report, broad latitude in their use of personal financial information.209 
In fact, the FCRA sets forth as one of its core purposes the maintenance 
and protection of the “elaborate mechanism [that] has been developed 
for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, 
credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers.”210  In 
essence, the FCRA legitimizes and regulates profiling activities with 
reference to the consumer reporting industry.  But because of its limited 
applicability to credit reporting agencies, it has no effect on and does not 
regulate the elaborate mechanisms for scoring consumer risk and 
behavior that have now spread to the balance of the financial services 
industry.211 
The Federal Financial Modernization Act, commonly known as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed by Congress and signed 
into law by the President in November 1999.  The purpose of the GLBA 
was “to enhance competition in the financial services industry by 
providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities 
firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers.”212  At 
the same time, Congress recognized the increased vulnerability of consumers 
to the dissemination of their personal financial information that such a 
structure would permit.213  Thus, Congress enacted Title V of the Act for 
purpose of ensuring that “each financial institution ha[ve] an affirmative 
and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to 
protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic 
 
 209. However, the D.C. Circuit has recently upheld the FTC’s interpretation that a 
targeted marketing list generated by a consumer reporting agency is included in the 
ambit of a “consumer report” under the FCRA and that targeted marketing was not a 
permissible purpose under the Act.  Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C., 245 F.3d 809, 812, 819 
(D.C. Cir. 2001), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 2386 (2002). 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2) (2000).  This elaborate mechanism was found by 
Congress to be critical to the continued health of the banking system.  Id. § 1681(a)(1). 
 211. In fact, a recent decision limiting the ability of the credit reporting agencies to 
disclose personally identifiable financial information to direct marketers may forge a 
new alliance between the financial services industry (which is not generally subject to 
the FCRA strictures) and the direct marketing association for purposes of the profiling of 
consumer transaction information.  See Individual Reference Servs. Group v. F.T.C., 145 
F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (2002).  In 
Individual Reference Services Group, the district court upheld an FTC regulation that 
prevented the credit reporting agencies from distributing credit header, tradeline, or 
aggregate data obtained from financial institutions.  The appeals court upheld the district 
court decision, but refused to rule on the permissible uses of data aggregated by the 
CRAs, stating that the issue was “not yet ripe” because the FTC had “not determined 
whether or to what extent aggregation should be considered ‘use’” under the applicable 
FTC regulation.  Trans Union LLC, 296 F.3d at 51.  This decision effectively places the 
FTC in the crucial role of defining (or perhaps of declining to define) the parameters for 
data aggregation and profiling of financial information permitted under the GLBA.   
 212. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-434, at 245–46 (1999). 
 213. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 98 (1999). 
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personal information.”214  Under the Act, the regulators are given discretion 
to establish standards for financial institutions in the protection of the 
security and confidentiality of customer records and information.215  
These include (1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information, (2) to protect against any anticipated threats or 
hazards to the security or integrity of such records, and (3) to protect 
against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information 
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.216  
The GLBA extends its authority over “financial institutions,” which are 
defined broadly as “any institution the business of which is engaging in 
financial activities as described in Section 1843(k) of title 12.”217 
Although the GLBA sets forth as one of its core purposes the 
prevention of the unauthorized use of personal financial information 
which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any 
customer,218 the Act fails to set any express use restrictions on 
information and instead codifies a mechanism for permissible 
disclosures to third parties.  The GLBA prohibits financial institutions 
from disclosing to nonaffiliated third parties any nonpublic personal 
information, unless that consumer has first been provided with a notice 
that permits the consumer to opt-out of those disclosures.219  A financial 
institution must “clearly and conspicuous[ly]”220 disclose to a consumer its 
practices with regard to (1) disclosure of nonpublic personal information to 
affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties, (2) disclosure of nonpublic 
personal information of persons who have ceased to be its customers, 
and (3) its measures to protect a consumer’s nonpublic personal 
 
 214. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000). 
 215. Id. § 6802. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. § 6809(3)(A). 
 218. See, e.g., Joan P. Warrington, Synopsis of S. 900 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Title V—Privacy, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: FINANCIAL SERVICES 
MODERNIZATION (2000), available at LEXIS SEA1 ALI-ABA 213, 215 (“This broad 
language could be construed by regulators to allow issuance of regulations much broader 
than the statutory language.  Certainly, the concept of customer ‘inconvenience’ is a 
troublesome standard, one that could be exploited by class action lawyers.  For example, 
telemarketing and spam could be considered inconveniences.”). 
 219. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2000). 
 220. Some have suggested that the notices sent by financial institutions were far 
from clear or conspicuous.  See Confusing Privacy Notices Leave Consumers Exposed, 
USA TODAY, July  9, 2001, at 13A.  An ABA survey indicated that forty-one percent of 
respondents could not recall receiving the prescribed privacy notices.  Id.  Perhaps as a 
result, less than one percent of consumers have opted-out of information sharing.  Id. 
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information.221  However, under the GLBA a consumer is not 
empowered to prevent a financial institution’s disclosure of his or her 
nonpublic personal information to its affiliates.222  Nor may a consumer 
prohibit a financial institution from sharing such information with “a 
nonaffiliated third party . . . perform[ing] services for or functions on 
behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial 
institution’s own products or services, or financial products or services 
offered pursuant to joint agreements between two or more financial 
institutions,”223 provided that the financial institution “fully discloses” this 
type of activity to the consumer.224 
Thus, the GLBA does not provide a consumer with any substantive 
protection against the profiling of his or her financial information.  First, 
although the GLBA does permit a consumer to prevent the sharing of his 
or her personal financial information with nonaffiliated third parties, the 
Act provides no protection whatsoever against the sharing of a 
consumer’s financial information with the financial institution’s affiliates or 
by the financial institution’s marketing partners.225  In addition, the 
exception for disclosure to affiliates provides a very broad carve out to 
the Act’s limits on disclosure to third parties.  And, the permitted 
disclosures to financial institutions under joint marketing agreements 
have been described by some as including “everything but the kitchen 
sink” because of the expansive definition of the term “financial 
institution” under the Act.226 
 
 221. 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2000). 
 222. Id. § 6802(b)(2) (2000). 
 223. The exception for marketing partners was a last-minute addition to the 
legislation, without a full conference committee debate, at the behest of industry 
lobbyists such as GE Capital Services, Inc.  See Michael Schroeder, Late Requests for 
Favors and Fixes Precede Votes on Landmark Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at 
A2.  Some have suggested that this exception, as well as the exception for affiliates, 
negates any real privacy protection under the bill.  William Raspberry, Privacy: The 
Horse Has Left the Barn, WASH. POST, June 25, 2001, at A15, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/opinion/A41200-2001Jun24.html. 
 224. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2).  The method, frequency and standard for “fully 
discloses” is not defined in the Act. 
 225. The potential scope of disclosures to affiliates is illustrated by several of the 
recent mergers that have resulted from the liberalization of the banking industry: the 
creation of Citigroup by the merger of Citicorp and Travelers; Royal Bank of Canada’s 
acquisition of the life insurance subsidiaries of Liberty Corporation, Dexia’s acquisition 
of Financial Security Assurance and MetLife, Inc.’s, acquisition of Grand Bank N.A. of 
Kingston, N.J.  See Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. et al., Financial Services Reform: The New 
Business of Banking and Insurance Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 2001 PRACTISING L. 
INST., GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY UPDATE 121, 123–24. 
 226. Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and 
the Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163, 
193 (2001)  (explaining that a financial institution includes “any institution that engages 
in activities that are financial in nature, incidental to such financial activity or 
complementary to a financial activity”).  
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
[VOL. 39:  943, 2002]  Consumer Profiling in Financial Services 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 985 
Second, the Act gives consumers no knowledge or control over the 
uses of their nonpublic personal information by the financial institution, 
by the financial institution’s affiliates, by the financial institution’s 
marketing partners, or (if they failed to opt-out) by nonaffiliated third 
parties.  In addition, the annual notices that a financial institution is 
required to send to a consumer must only describe the financial 
institution’s practices concerning the disclosure and security procedures 
in regard to the nonpublic personal information, not the uses to which 
this information may be put.  In fact, at least one bank that formerly did 
provide its customers with notice of its profiling practices has now 
deleted that information from its privacy policy with the enactment of 
the GLBA.227 
Third, the likely effect of the GLBA will be to increase the incidence 
of profiling.  Your bank now may become a financial holding company, 
and may act as banker, insurance provider, realtor, and stock broker.  
The resulting scope and breadth of the data aggregations that are thus 
created may open the floodgates to data sharing and data profiling.  
Under the GLBA, consumers who fail to opt-out may be assumed to 
have waived any express or implied restrictions on disclosure of their 
financial information to third parties.228  The wealth of personal financial 
data thus available for marketing purposes, combined with the effect of 
recent case law decisions limiting such uses by the credit reporting 
agencies,229 may have the effect of forging a stronger alliance between 
 
 227. See FTC INFO MARKETPLACE, supra note 5 (remarks of Ms. Culnan).  Mary 
Culnan, Slade Professor of Management and Information Technology at Bentley College 
in Waltham, Massachusetts, conducts research on information privacy.  She made the 
following remarks at the FTC’s Public Workshop on the Information Marketplace: 
[T]here was one excellent financial services notice about enhancement that 
basically said, [“]We do profiling, we do data mining, we acquire third-party 
data, non credit report data, to understand how you use our card and we use 
this to serve you better,[”] and they had an opt-out form right with the 
notice, and you could mail that back or call the 800 number.  Unfortunately, 
with the Gramm[-]Leach[-]Bliley requirement, that doesn’t cause companies 
to have to specify how they’re going to use information, just what they 
collect and who they disclose it to.  That very nice statement disappeared 
from the Gramm[-]Leach[-]Bliley notice that this company has sent out, 
which is now their de facto privacy notice. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 228. But see infra Part V.C. 
 229. See generally Individual Reference Servs. Group v. F.T.C., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 
32 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (2002) (holding that 
consumer reporting agencies are precluded from disclosing their “credit header” 
information on consumers to third parties without abiding by the notice provisions of the 
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financial institutions and the direct marketing industry. 
The GLBA allows the states to craft greater protection for nonpublic 
personal information under state legislation, except to the extent of any 
inconsistency with the GLBA.  The Act expressly explains that a state 
law is not deemed inconsistent with the GLBA if the law provides 
protection greater than that provided under the Act.230  Bills have been 
introduced into Congress to modify the GLBA to eliminate the exception 
for information sharing among affiliates and to require opt-in prior to 
any information sharing.  However, intense industry lobbying activities 
at the state and federal level indicate that it will be extraordinarily 
difficult to establish legislation providing any greater protection for 
nonpublic financial information than that which currently exists under 
the GLBA.231 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: A COMMON LAW SOLUTION 
“Law never is, but is always about to be.”232 
In light of the paucity of constitutional and legislative protections 
against invasions of information privacy by the private sector, is there a 
common law right that will afford a solution?  Prior to his tenure on the 
Supreme Court, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a law review article in 
conjunction with his friend from Harvard Law School, Samuel Warren, 
entitled, “The Right to Privacy.”233  This law review article was destined 
 
GLBA).  Thus, financial institutions are likely to become the data vendor of choice for 
the Direct Marketing Association.  Because the consumer reporting agencies do not have 
direct relationships with individual consumers, the ruling effectively precludes the 
agencies’ sale of this data to marketers.  And obtaining consumer financial data from 
financial holding companies rather than credit reporting agencies obviates the necessity 
of abiding by the fair information practices that restrict the permitted uses of credit data 
under the FCRA.  See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 230. 15 U.S.C. § 6807 (2000). 
 231. Rachel Zimmerman & Glenn R. Simpson, Lobbyists Swarm to Stop Tough 
Privacy Bills in States, WALL ST. J., April 21, 2000, at A16; Robert Salladay, Davis May 
Weaken Privacy Measure, N. COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), Aug. 3, 2001, at A-3; 
Editorial, Davis Stands Privacy Bill on Its Head, N. COUNTY TIMES (San Diego), Aug. 
31, 2001, at A-18. 
 232. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Method of Sociology, The Judge as Legislator, 
Address Before the Law School of Yale University (1921), in THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 98, 126 (1921). 
 233. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 193 (articulating some of the same 
concepts that were later repeated in Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent).  The similarities 
between the language of the law review article, which concerned itself with the civil 
protections of the right to privacy, and the Olmstead dissent, which related to the 
constitutional right to privacy, would indicate that Brandeis saw a theoretical link 
between the common law right to privacy and the constitutional protection of the 
liberties of man against government oppression.  “The common law has always 
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to become known as the “outstanding example of the influence of legal 
periodicals upon the American law.”234  The Right to Privacy leads off 
with the assertion that the “recognition of man’s spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and his intellect” have broadened the natural rights of man to 
include the “right to be let alone.”235  The article went on to trace the 
development of the civil protection of this right through the tort actions 
of battery, assault, nuisance, slander and libel, the protection of 
intellectual property, and finally to the fullest and highest expression of 
this liberty right which is found in the law’s protection of the right to 
privacy.236  Some have characterized the Warren and Brandeis law 
review article as a response to the yellow journalism and “kodakers” 
found in Boston of the late 1800s.237  However, a reading of the close 
parallels of the law review article to Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent may 
indicate that the article was not a statement about the overreaching of the 
press,238 but rather it was an expression of Brandeis’ prescient concern 
over the invasive potential of technology and the importance of the 
growth of the law to “defin[e] anew the exact nature and extent of [full 
protection of the individual in person and in property] in light of that 
invasiveness.”239 
 
recognized a man’s house as his castle . . . [s]hall the courts thus close the front entrance 
to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?”  Id. at 
220. 
 234. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960). 
 235. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 193. 
 236. Id. at 193–95. 
 237. See, e.g., ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 338 (1967) (referring to use 
of the “instantaneous photography” perfected by Kodak in the late 1880s).  Following 
this line of reasoning, Dean William Prosser wrote that the article was penned as a 
response to Samuel Warren’s annoyance at the invasive behavior of the press at the 
wedding of Warren’s daughter.  Prosser, supra note 234, at 383.  Prosser surmises that 
“she must have been a very beautiful girl. . . . This was the face that launched a thousand 
lawsuits.”  Id. at 423.  Although great prose, Prosser’s tale may be apocryphal.  Warren 
married in 1883 and Warren’s daughter was only six years old in 1890 when the article 
was published.  See LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 35 (1983).  In addition, modern 
researchers have found scant evidence of an abusive form of journalism in Boston in the 
1890s.  Id. 
 238. In fact, the article goes to great lengths to set forth the applicable limits to the 
right of privacy that protect the First Amendment rights of the press for matters of public 
or general interest, establish privileged communications, and set forth protection for oral 
publications.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 214–17. 
 239. Id.  The article expressly mentioned concern over the protection of the “right to 
be let alone,” in view of “recent inventions and business methods,” “mechanical 
devices,” and  “instantaneous photographs,” along with the “intensity and complexity of 
life” brought on by “modern enterprise and invention.”  Id. at 195–96.  These concerns 
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The New York Court of Appeals was one of the first courts to deal 
with the privacy gauntlet that Warren and Brandeis had thrown down in 
The Right to Privacy.  And the court’s swift response was to reject the 
right of privacy in its entirety.240  The court explained its reasoning to 
the effect that the introduction of such a right would usher in vast 
amounts of litigation and it would be impossible to demarcate the line 
between a plaintiff’s right of privacy and the rights of others.241  The 
response of the legal community to this decision was generally that of 
regret.242  Three years later, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co.,243 the Georgia Supreme Court criticized the New York decision in a 
 
about modern technology are echoed in Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent.  Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–78 (1927).  Indeed, one biographer of Louis Brandeis 
reports that the fervor of Brandeis’s dissent may have been driven at least in part by his 
concern over General Electric Corporation’s RCA subsidiary’s development of 
television and its potential for government surveillance uses.  An early draft of 
Brandeis’s dissent read that: “Through television, radium and photography, ways may 
soon be developed by which the Government can, without removing papers from secret 
drawers, reproduce them in court.”  PAPER, supra note 237, at 312.  The Warren Court 
later vindicated many of the views Brandeis set forth in the Olmstead dissent.  See supra 
notes 152–153 and accompanying text.  However, the Supreme Court, by its failure to 
give express protection against the invasiveness of modern profiling technologies, has 
not yet given full vindication to Brandeis’s views that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
should protect against “[a]dvances in the psychic and related sciences [that] may bring 
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.”  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 
474. 
 240. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447–48 (N.Y. 1902).  In 
Roberson, a woman sued to recover for damages caused by humiliation and sickness on 
account of a flour milling company’s reproduction of her image, without her consent, on 
its boxes of flour next to the advertising slogan, “the flour of the family.”  Id. at 442.  
The trial court had held that the woman had a right of property in her own self, and thus 
denied the defendant’s demurrer.  Id. at 442.  The defendant appealed and the New York 
Court of Appeals, in a four-to-three decision, reversed, holding that there was no right of 
privacy as a matter of law.  Id. at 447–48. 
 241. Id. at 443.  Some have traced New York Supreme Court Chief Justice Parker’s 
reticence to accord protection to the right of privacy to the fact that he subscribed to the 
theory of legal positivism that “views ‘law’ as consisting solely of an objectively 
determined body of enactments, principles, doctrines and rules which are fixed in 
advance of litigation.”  PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND METHODS, supra note 132, at 54–55. 
 242. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co, 50 S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905) (listing 
critical law review articles).  An editorial in the American Law Review offered the 
opinion that the decision “shocks and wounds the ordinary sense of justice of mankind.”  
Right to Privacy: Injunction Denied a Young Woman to Restrain the Publication of Her 
Portrait on Commercial Packages for the Purpose of Advertising, 36 ALR 614, 636 
(1905).  The New York legislature quickly responded to the decision by enacting 
Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Act which provided a statutory cause 
of action for invasion of privacy.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2001).  
Section 50 reads as follows: “A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising 
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person 
without having first obtained the written consent of such person . . . is guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”  Id. § 50. 
 243. 50 S.E. at 68.  In Pavesich, an insurance company had used plaintiff’s 
photograph in an advertisement for insurance containing a false statement of plaintiff’s 
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similar fact situation in which a photograph of the plaintiff was used to 
market a life insurance product.  The court penned an elaborate opinion 
tracing the history of privacy from early civilization as justification for 
the rationale that privacy was a natural right of man.  Justice Cobb 
depicted the right of privacy as rooted in the liberty interest to be free 
from commercial exploitation as follows: 
The knowledge that one’s features and form are being used for such a 
purpose . . . brings . . . the person . . . to a realization that his liberty has been 
taken away from him . . . he is no longer free, and . . . he is, in reality a slave 
without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master.244 
The Pavesich decision gave common law legitimacy to the right of 
privacy introduced by Warren and Brandeis, and other courts generally 
followed the decision.245 
More than fifty years later, Dean Prosser took a look at the legal 
landscape of privacy and compared it to “a haystack in a hurricane”246 
due to the utter disarray and confusion in the law.  So Prosser set forth to 
codify the right of privacy into four causes of action which, although 
dissimilar in the scope of circumstances they covered, had as their 
unifying principle that “each represents an interference with the right of 
the plaintiff . . . ‘to be let alone.’”247  Prosser delineated these four torts 
as follows: 
 
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or 
into his  private affairs;   
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about   
the plaintiff; 
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in 
the public eye; and 
 
endorsement of defendant’s life insurance products that was published in the Atlanta 
Constitution.  Id. at 68.  The plaintiff sued on the right of privacy, alleging that the 
statement attributed to him was offensive.  Id. at 69.  While the dissent in Roberson 
unsuccessfully relied on Lockean property rights to justify a right of privacy, Roberson, 
64 N.E. at 448–51, Justice Cobb in Pavesich, while relying in part on Judge Grey’s 
Roberson dissent, instead relied on a natural rights theory.  Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73–74. 
 244. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80. 
 245. For the historical listing of cases and statutes recognizing the right of privacy 
after the Pavesich decision, see Prosser, supra note 234, at 386–88 nn.17–58. 
 246. Prosser, supra note 234, at 407 (quoting Biggs, J., in Ettore v. Philco 
Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956)). 
 247. Prosser, supra note 234, at 389 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
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(4) Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the   
 plaintiff’s name or likeness248 
Prosser’s theory of the four-fold manifestation of the tort received 
some initial disagreement.249  But eventually Prosser’s analysis prevailed 
as the general standard, receiving codification in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts250 and, as such, serves as the basis for most states’ 
common law privacy doctrines.  Of these categories, the intrusion on 
seclusion and the appropriation torts may provide protection against 
profiling. 
A.  Intrusion on Seclusion 
The tort of intrusion on seclusion occurs when “[o]ne . . . intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”251  This form of invasion of 
privacy focuses on the manner in which the information is obtained and 
implicates the “use of the defendant’s senses, with or without 
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs.”252  
The tort therefore does not require any actual disclosure of the 
information to a third party to be actionable.253  Public information is not 
protected under the tort, and the intrusion must therefore invade the zone 
of “private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or 
affairs.”254  The crux of the tort is that the intrusion must be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.  And the standard for “highly offensive” 
turns on whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
against that intrusion.255 
Because the intrusion must abrogate the plaintiff’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, is the applicability of the intrusion tort to 
disclosures of financial information to the private sector therefore 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An 
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Hyman Gross, The Concept of 
Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34 (1967); see also infra notes 278–281 and accompanying 
text. 
 250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977). 
 251. Id. § 652B. 
 252. Id. at cmt. b.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the following as 
examples of actionable behavior: opening a person’s mail, searching a person’s wallet, 
and viewing his private bank account.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 253. See Id. at cmt. a. 
 254. Id. at cmt. c. 
 255. See White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 91–92 (N.J. 2001) (reasoning that the 
definition of what is highly offensive to a reasonable person turns on one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which is measured objectively). 
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hampered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller?  Because the 
Court in Miller held that a bank customer has “no expectation of 
privacy” against disclosure of his financial information to governmental 
authorities,256 some have generalized this principle and have concluded 
that a consumer also has no reasonable expectation of privacy against 
disclosure of his or her financial information to a private sector actor.257  
But, in fact, the Court in Miller was careful to distinguish the Fourth 
Amendment expectation of privacy (that is, where financial records are 
provided to the government under a subpoena duces tecum) from a 
situation where a consumer’s financial records are disclosed to the 
private sector.258 
Some have also taken the holding in Miller to stand for the principle 
that an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in business 
records that have been voluntarily conveyed to the bank and have thus 
become the bank’s property.259  According to this line of reasoning, the 
 
 256. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–45 (1976). 
 257. See FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-8 (suggesting that the lack of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in financial data precludes any liability under the intrusion tort 
unless the financial institution acts in an unreasonable or outrageous manner).  A senior 
bank official at a large credit card company stated that information sharing by banks with 
third parties has “long been a standard industry practice” and is given endorsement by 
federal regulators as being “a reasonable part of commerce.”  See Lisa Fickenscher, 
Chase Pact in N.Y. Shows How States Could Set Privacy Rules, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 
2000, at 1. 
 258. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff did 
not have a constitutionally protected zone of privacy in financial records).  The Court’s 
holding was quite narrow and limited any disclosure to the context of a narrowly-focused 
subpoena duces tecum, which was therefore subject to the accordant legal restraints.  The 
Court distinguished its holding from a fact pattern implicating a “wide-ranging inquiry 
that ‘unnecessarily touches upon intimate areas of an individual’s personal affairs.’”  Id. 
at 444–45 n.6 (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974)).  
Notwithstanding the absence of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy in financial 
information, the Court acknowledged the duty that is incumbent upon a financial 
institution to protect this information from disclosure to the private sector: 
This court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed. 
Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
 259. See, e.g., CATE,  supra note 9, at 15 (citing Miller for the proposition that it is 
“fundamentally unfair [to prohibit] financial institutions from using . . . information that 
they have spent millions of dollars collecting and in which they have a legally 
recognized property interest”).  A. Michael Froomkin called this phenomenon the “joint 
and several ownership of the facts of a transaction.”  Froomkin, supra note 121, at 1502. 
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bank is free to do whatever it wants with any personal financial 
information in its possession.  The Indiana Court of Appeals recently 
was asked to review the reductio ad absurdum of this syllogism—in a 
slightly different context—and rejected it in its entirety with the 
following statement: 
It does not follow that one gives up all expectations of privacy and therefore, 
waives all [privacy] claims . . . when voluntarily revealing one’s affairs to a 
third party. . . . [T]o the extent that our [prior holding] . . . may be read to align 
fourth amendment expectation of privacy analysis with the tort of invasion of 
privacy in general, we disaffirm such a reading.260 
The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
disclosure to the private sector is also substantiated by holdings in 
actions arising out of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).261  In the 
context of the government’s disclosure of an individual’s personal 
information to the private sector, the federal courts have found a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in names and addresses,262 in information 
concerning private activities, and in activities taking place in the 
home.263  Furthermore, in this context, at least one court has found a 
significant privacy interest in financial information that is combined 
with names and addresses.264 
The reasonable expectation of privacy in financial information is 
further demonstrated by the protection accorded to financial information 
under the breach of confidence tort.265  The duty of confidentiality is 
based on precedent found in English common law.266  Many state courts 
have adopted the English precedent and accord a duty of confidentiality 
towards any information learned “in the character of a banker.”267 Such 
 
 260. Pohle v. Cheatham, 724 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).  In Pohle, 
Cheatham had taken compromising pictures of his ex-wife with her permission.  Id. at 
657.  The pictures were deemed Cheatham’s property by virtue of the divorce decree.  Id.  
Cheatham then proceeded to post these pictures in conspicuous places around town.  Id. 
at 657.  Pohle sued, premised on a public disclosure of private facts cause of action.  Id. 
at 657–58.  Cheatham raised the defense of waiver, relying on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, arguing that because the plaintiff had voluntarily “taken the risk in 
revealing [her] affairs to third parties that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to law enforcement officials” she therefore had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the photographs.  Id. at 660.  The court held for the plaintiff.  Id. at 661.   
 261. 5 U.S.C § 552 (2000). 
 262. HMG Mktg. Assoc. v. Freeman, 523 F. Supp. 11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 263. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 264. Aronson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 822 F.2d 182, 186 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
 265. For a discussion of the breach of confidence tort see, Susan M. Gilles, 
Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence As a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 57 n.250 (collecting cases). 
 266. Tournier v. Nat’l Provincial & Union Bank of Eng., 1 K.B. 461 (Eng. C.A. 
1924). 
 267. See McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. 1998).  For states adopting 
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information must not be disclosed to third parties, except under 
compulsion of law, for prevention of crime or fraud against the bank or a 
third party, or with the implied or express consent of the customer.268  
Judicial precedents are not in accord as to the source of the duty of 
confidentiality, but some trace its basis in the right of privacy.269  One 
court expressed the parallel between the duty of confidentiality and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy as: “A bank customer’s reasonable 
expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he 
reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking 
purposes.”270 
Furthermore, the second branch of the tort is satisfied by the fact that 
intrusion into personal financial affairs by a third party is highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.271  Profiling is especially intrusive, and 
can reveal intimate details of a person’s activities, associations, and 
beliefs.  Profiling therefore could easily be found to intrude into the zone 
of seclusion that a person throws about his affairs.272  Because the 
reasonable expectation of privacy is often defined with reference to 
general social norms,273 the high incidence of consumer discomfort with 
financial profiling274 further demonstrates the strength of the reasonable 
 
the Tournier doctrine, see  FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-10 to 5-16. 
 268. See generally FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-10 to 5-16.  Fischer observes that 
the Tournier doctrine is basically identical to the scope of consumer privacy outlined by 
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c)–(d) (2000).  FISCHER, 
supra note 157, at 5-11. 
 269. See, e.g., McGuire, 722 A.2d at 1091 (“It is an implied term of the contract 
between the banker and his customer that the banker will not divulge to third persons, 
without the consent of the customer, express or implied, either the state of the customer’s 
account or any of his transactions with the bank, or any information relating to the 
customer acquired through the keeping of his account.” (quoting Peterson v. Idaho First 
Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961)); see also DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF 
PRIVACY 370 (1991 & Supp. May 2001) (implied contract).  FISCHER, supra note 157, at 
5-15 (implied contract).  But there is considerable legal confusion over the source of this 
duty and whether it actually arises in tort.  See Giles, supra note 128, at 18 n.86 & 55 nn. 
245–51 (collecting cases). 
 270. Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974) (emphasis added). 
 271. McGuire, 722 A.2d at 1092. 
 272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).  This may be 
analogized to the Supreme Court’s protection of a zone of privacy in intimate 
associations from state intrusion under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See supra notes 
165–76 and accompanying text. 
 273. See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 802–03 (N.J. 1990). 
 274. Statistics reveal that at least ninety-five percent of people questioned would be 
either not very comfortable or not at all comfortable with the creation of a profile that 
contained their financial data.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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expectation of privacy in financial information. 
Therefore, the intrusion on seclusion tort is likely to provide a basis of 
relief against intrusive computer profiling activities in the financial 
services industry.  However, in alignment with the parameters of the 
duty of confidentiality, the tort would not be implicated where the 
financial institution used the consumer’s information for internal 
banking purposes incident to the normal course of a business transaction.  
Liability under the tort would probably be limited to situations where 
information is collected in an unreasonably intrusive manner or when the 
consumer’s profile is used to facilitate offensive marketing or 
discriminatory scoring activities. 
B.  The Appropriation Privacy Tort 
The appropriation privacy tort may also provide a basis to prevent 
profiling activities by effectively setting restrictions on the permissible 
uses of personal financial information.  As the appropriation tort is set 
out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the cause of action presents the 
following deceptively simple formulation: “One who appropriates to his 
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability 
to the other for invasion of his privacy.”275  In order to determine if the 
appropriation privacy tort can afford a remedy against computer 
profiling, the following four questions must be answered: (1) what is the 
nature of the interest protected, (2) what are the aspects of identity, (3) 
how is the interest invaded, and (4) what constitutes an “appropriation” 
for purposes of the tort? 
1.  The Nature of the Interest Protected: A Right Just for Blondes, 
“Kings,” and Legends, or a Right for the Rest of Us? 
As expressed in Part III of this Comment, information privacy is 
unlikely to be accorded any real protection by virtue of consumers being 
assigned property rights in their transaction data.  For this reason, many 
who have looked at the possible applicability of the appropriation 
privacy tort for solving issues of information privacy have concluded 
that it was unsuitable for this application by virtue of the fact that it was 
inherently a property right.276  This Part seeks to demonstrate that the 
appropriation privacy tort is in fact not a property right that capitalizes 
 
 275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 276. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 74, at 778–79 (“The misappropriation tort 
safeguards the monetary value of the kind of self-revelation that our culture associates 
with celebrity status. . . .  But the misappropriation tort will not establish constitutive 
privacy’s domains of access and non-access to information.”). 
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on a person’s ability to recover from the “user’s failure to pay” for the 
use of his or her likeness, but rather is a personal right rooted in the 
injury to sensibilities that occurs with the shock of confronting the 
commercialization of one’s own self.277 
The early disagreement over Prosser’s codification of the right to 
privacy arose out of some legal scholars’ concern with Prosser’s implication 
of a “proprietary” interest278 as the rationale for the appropriation tort, as 
 
 277. See James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and 
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 641 (1973).  It should probably be noted at this 
point that Thomas J. McCarthy cautions against the use of the labels of  “personal rights” 
and “property rights” to describe the appropriation privacy and right of publicity torts, 
respectively, because these attributions flow from and do not create the difference 
between the right of privacy and the right of publicity.  McCarthy stresses that the crucial 
difference between the rights is the nature of the right invaded.  In Mr. McCarthy’s 
words, the right of publicity protects the pocketbook, and the right of privacy protects the 
psyche.  Once this distinction is understood, Mr. McCarthy advises that the labels of 
property versus personal rights may follow without the danger of having us march “lock-
step into any preconceived result.” 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY § 5:65, at 5-121 (2d ed. 2001). 
 278. See PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS  854 (W. Page Keeton gen. ed., 
student ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (“[T]he effect of the appropriation decisions is to 
recognize or create an exclusive right in the individual plaintiff to a species of trade 
name, his own, and a kind of trade mark in his likeness. . . . [I]t is at least clearly 
proprietary in its nature.”).  In accord with Prosser’s depiction of the appropriation right 
of privacy as proprietary in nature, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the interest 
protected as follows: 
The interest protected . . . is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use 
of his own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in 
so far as the use may be of benefit to him or to others.  Although the protection 
of his personal feelings against mental distress is an important factor . . . the 
right created by it is in the nature of a property right, for the exercise of which 
an exclusive license may be given to a third person. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977). 
However, it is probable that Prosser viewed the creation of a proprietary interest as 
based in the tort’s protection against mental anguish.  Prosser later clarified his position 
on the basis for the proprietary nature of the interest protected in a little-known German 
law review article published in 1956.  In this article Prosser explained that his intent was 
to create a right similar to the German right of personality.  The German right of 
personality protects both mental and commercial rights but is a personality right and not 
an assignable property right.  See PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 94 & n.156 (citing 
William Prosser, Das Recht auf die Privatsphäre in Amerika, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 401, 404 (1956)).  The rush to 
proclaim the appropriation privacy a property right from Prosser’s statement that it 
protected a proprietary interest may have been premature, in the light of the analysis of 
Calabresi and Melamed that a liability rule can have the effect of producing a licensable 
entitlement, and not a property right per se, particularly where social or economic factors 
mitigate against allowing alienability of the entitlement.  See Calabresi & Melamed, 
supra note 115, at 1111–15.  Prosser clearly stated that the four torts covered under right 
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distinguished from the intrusion, false light, and disclosure of private 
facts torts, which otherwise protect a right of inviolate personality and 
the right to be let alone.  These scholars rested their arguments on 
Warren and Brandeis’s clear delineation of the right of privacy as not as 
implicating any right of private property, but as a form of injuria, a 
cause of action similar to battery—that of the right to one’s “inviolate 
personality.”279  Legal scholars thus countered Prosser’s codification by 
reasoning that the right of privacy should remain as a unified tort based 
solely in the protection of human rights.280  Prosser’s somewhat 
equivocal approach to the issue was to admonish that disputes over 
whether the appropriation privacy tort constituted a property right were 
“pointless.”281 
Thus, despite its humble beginnings rooted in the protection of the 
common man against commercial appropriation of his name or 
photograph, the appropriation privacy tort was promptly and 
expeditiously high-jacked by a parade of celebrity litigants who perhaps 
saw in the tort a means of licensing their celebrity images without being 
hampered by the statutory limitations normally imposed on intellectual 
property rights.282  This rather striking development initially gave many 
 
of privacy were not alienable rights.  Prosser, supra note 234, at 408 (“[T]he plaintiff’s 
right is a personal one . . . .  The right is not assignable.”).  For a further review of the 
German right of personality, see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY § 6:154, at 6-300 to 6-302 (2d ed. 2001); see generally Susanne 
Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and in Germany: A Comparative 
Analysis, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. REV. 479 (1999). 
 279. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 205, 207, 231.  But see id. at 205 n.1 
(indicating proprietary nature of unpublished manuscripts which, although not property, 
may be an incorporeal right or “substantial right of legal interest”). 
 280. See Bloustein, supra note 249, at 962. 
 281. Prosser, supra note 234, at 406 (“It seems quite pointless to dispute over 
whether such a right is to be classified as ‘property.’  If it is not, it is at least, once it its 
protected by the law, a right of value upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling 
licenses.” (citations omitted)). 
 282. This parade has included the likes of Elvis Presley (as represented by the heirs, 
licensees and executors), Vanna White, Johnny Carson, Bette Midler, Michael Jordan, 
and numerous other celebrities, authors, musicians, sports legends, scientists, and other 
world-famous luminosities.  See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 
1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001) (Dustin in a designer dress); Groden v. Random House, Inc., 
61 F.3d. 1045, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (suit over defendant’s aspersions of Groden’s 
Kennedy assassination theory); Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 636–37 (9th Cir. 
1982) (Cher sues Forum Magazine over publication of an exclusive interview with US 
Magazine); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(publication of life story of former member of the Temptations), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 (6th 
Cir. 2001); MJ & Partners Rest. v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(licensees sue over exclusive use of Michael Jordan’s name in connection with Chicago 
area restaurants); Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 
1994) (Carl Sagan sues for his name being used as a code name for a new computer, 
which code was later changed to “Butt-Head Astronomer”); Estate of Elvis Presley v. 
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1348, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (suit over Elvis impersonation, 
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courts pause with reference to the internal conflicts inherent in applying 
a privacy tort to a celebrity whose very fame required widespread 
recognition and public use of their identity in a commercial context.283  
This concern set in motion the establishment of a separate cause of 
action for celebrity publicity rights, the right of publicity.284  Thomas P. 
McCarthy, in his treatise on privacy and publicity, expressed the 
differences between the appropriation right of privacy and the right of 
publicity as follows: 
The right of publicity is now a separate and distinct legal concept which 
recognizes the proprietary and commercial value of a person’s identity and 
persona.  Simply put, an infringement of the right of publicity focuses upon 
injury to the pocketbook, while an invasion of “appropriation privacy” focuses 
upon injury to the psyche.285 
Nevertheless, the question of the correct classification of the 
appropriation privacy tort, and whether it protects a human right or a 
property interest, continues to be debated to this day.286  And, because of 
 
The Big El Show); Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (Sup. Ct. 
1995) (internet service provider’s publication of Mr. Stern’s posterior). 
 283. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) 
(commenting on some courts’ refusal to apply the privacy tort action to celebrities). 
 284. The New York Court of Appeals attempted to solve this problem by 
establishing the right of publicity as a separate tort from the appropriation right of 
privacy in Haelan Labs. Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953).  Later, an influential legal scholar defined the need for the right of publicity in a 
law review article.  Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 203 (1954).  Nimmer distinguished the right of publicity, a property right, from 
the appropriation privacy tort, a personal right.  Id. at 203.  Nimmer is described by 
Thomas P. McCarthy as the “first builder of the right of publicity.”  MCCARTHY, supra 
note 277 § 5:64, at 5-119.  The Supreme Court, influenced by the views of Nimmer, 
followed with its own legitimization of the publicity tort, classifying it as a separate 
cause of action from the right to privacy in the celebrated “human cannonball” case, 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.  433 U.S. 562, 572–73 (1977).  Later, the 
American Law Institute gave the right of publicity its own separate codification as a right 
protecting the value inherent in a celebrity’s name, apart from the right of privacy.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. a (1995). 
 285. MCCARTHY supra note 277 § 5:61, at 5-110; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. b (1995) (“The history of the publicity tort . . . ha[s] 
created confusion regarding the appropriate measure of damages.  The right of publicity 
protects the commercial value of a person’s identity . . . .  [P]rotection is available under 
the right of privacy for the personal interest in controlling the use and exploitation of 
one’s own identity.”). 
 286. MCCARTHY, supra note 277 §§ 5:59 to 5:65, at 5-107 to 5-122; compare id. at 
5-115 (“Modern decisions clearly distinguish between the various types of privacy and 
the right of publicity.”), with ELDER, supra note 269, at 375 (“[M]ost more modern 
decisions have emphasized that the tort protects a ‘valuable right of property in the 
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the lack of clarity on this point, and regardless of Prosser’s careful four-
tort classification schema, the law concerning the appropriation privacy 
tort is repeatedly compared to a “haystack in a hurricane”,287 particularly 
with respect to the question of the proprietary nature of the tort. 
But, a review of the case law carefully distinguishing between cases 
that are pleaded and decided under the appropriation privacy tort versus 
those pleaded and decided under the right to publicity, reveals a 
consistent trend of the courts to treat the appropriation right of privacy as 
a personal right, distinct from the right to publicity.288  Furthermore, the 
gravamen of the appropriation privacy tort lies not in protecting a 
valuable thing against any loss of income from licensing revenues,289 but 
rather in the right to define a zone of inviolate personality into which 
commercial interests cannot intrude.  Another way of stating this 
distinction is that the right of publicity is analogous to an intellectual 
property right,290 whereas the appropriation privacy right is analogous to 
 
broadest sense of that term.’” (quoting McQueen v. Wilson, 161 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 1968), 
rev’d on other grounds, Wilson v. McQueen, 162 S.E.2d 313 (Ga. 1968))).  Mr. Elder 
distinguishes between the right of publicity and the right of privacy only as it relates to 
the issue of damages and bases the gravamen of the tort on property rights and the 
prevention of unjust enrichment.  Id. at 375–79. 
 287. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (D. Minn. 1970) 
(Neville, J., despairing of the continuing lack of consistency in the state of the law). 
 288. See e.g., Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(acknowledging that majority trend is that privacy and publicity fall under separate and 
distinct torts); Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 
1994); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 2000); Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 
703 (Ga. 1982) (the fundamental distinction is the measure of damages); Bear Foot, Inc. 
v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (collecting cases).  But see 
Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998) (distinction 
largely semantic); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279–80 (D. Minn. 
1970) (misappropriation involves pecuniary loss).  Most recent decisions are fairly 
consistent in their holdings that the appropriation right to privacy is a personal right, 
unlike the right of publicity, which protects against commercial harm and otherwise 
provides for a property right in the persona.  See, e.g., Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (Ct. App. 1993); Hudson v. Montcalm Publ’g Corp., 379 S.E.2d 
572, 576–77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Jones v. Hudgins, 295 S.E.2d 119, 121–22 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1982); Hetter v. State, 874 P.2d 762, 764–65 (Nev. 1994); Faber v. Condecor, Inc., 
477 A.2d 1289, 1294–95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co., 
581 A.2d 266, 268 (Vt. 1990).  But see Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38 
(5th Cir. 1994) (equating misappropriation with the expropriation of goodwill); MJ & 
Partners Rest. v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (reasoning that the 
appropriation privacy tort protected property rights, but eventually recognizing the 
existence in Illinois a common law right to publicity instead). 
 289. The term “property” refers to legal relations between people with respect to 
things and is used to describe a bundle of rights in the thing.  The property bundle of 
rights is as follows: “1) the right of possession, use and fruits or profits of the thing; 2) 
the right to exclude others; [and] 3) the right to dispose of (e.g., to alienate) the thing.”  
PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 263. 
 290. And indeed, many courts have utilized concepts from intellectual property law 
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the right to be free from defamation or battery.291  However, as opposed 
to most torts protecting personal rights, the appropriation tort is 
complete without proof of emotional distress or economic damage to the 
plaintiff.  The focus of the tort is the defendant’s intentional use of the 
plaintiff’s identity for the defendant’s benefit.  Thus, damages under the 
tort may stem either from the harm suffered by the plaintiff or may be 
calculated with reference to the economic benefit accruing to the 
defendant.292 
2. What are the Aspects of Identity and the Characteristics                       
of Its Indicia? 
A second aspect of the nature of the privacy interest has to do with 
what constitutes a “name” or “likeness” under the tort.  The appropriation 
tort includes under its protective ambit any appropriation of a name or 
likeness for one’s use or benefit.293  If a computer profile is a likeness, it 
could come under the protection of the tort.  Although limited under 
some privacy statutes,294 the majority of courts give a broad definition to 
the indicia of identity.295  In essence, the tort has the capacity to protect 
any tangible expression of identity that can be identified by others as a 
 
in their analysis of the right of publicity.  See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 
136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying the first-sale doctrine).  For an analysis 
of the right of publicity as an intellectual property right see PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 
263–80; cf. Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 
49 DUKE L.J. 383 (1999) (applying copyright doctrines to publicity while also theorizing 
that a Kantian foundation more accurately reflects the value of the human being behind 
the persona at issue). 
 291. Laurence Tribe has suggested a parallel between the “psychic mayhem” caused 
by violence to one’s personal identity and the physical injury caused by a battery.  TRIBE, 
supra note 138, at 887–88. 
 292. See, e.g., Harbin v. Jennings, 734 So. 2d 269, 273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) 
(Invasion of privacy in this type of action is an intentional tort and thus actual injury is 
not essential to establish a case of liability, and nominal damages would apply). 
 293. RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 294. Some courts have drawn very narrow interpretations of these terms and have 
thus delimited the concept to include only name or photographic likeness, although most 
often this form of interpretive analysis arises in the context of statutory, and not common 
law, privacy causes of action.  Wilkinson v. Methodist, Richard Young Hosp., 612 
N.W.2d 213, 216 (Neb. 2000) (concluding that under Nebraska’s privacy statute that 
computer records could not constitute a form of “name or likeness,” because the statute 
only mentioned photographs or other similar likenesses). 
 295. The author of the major treatise on privacy and publicity, Thomas McCarthy, 
describes the cause of action as covering use of any “aspect of the plaintiff’s identity or 
persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant’s use.”  MCCARTHY, 
supra note 277 § 5:60, at 5-109. 
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symbol of the personality.296  The Ninth Circuit in White v. Samsung297 
moreover indicated a preference for maintaining open, expansive 
definitions of the contours of what might constitute identity.  In White, 
the court indicated it was not disposed to any set delineation of what 
factors can constitute the identity under the right of publicity, because of 
its concern that such a formulation would present an invitation to sharp 
practices and abuse of the law.298 
When the concept of identity is applied to a transaction profile, a 
computer profile should be found to be an expression of the personality 
in the same way that a signature, a voice, or a computer-altered 
photograph has been found to be an expression of the personality.  
Precedent indicates that courts are willing to admit identification of the 
persona through extrinsic indicia, even where resemblances to the 
plaintiff are completely and obviously artificial.299  These extrinsic 
indicia do not have to be visual, but refer to any capture of identity.300  
 
 296. Very broad judicial interpretations to the dimensions of the aspect of identity 
revealed in the persona have been found under the right of publicity.  See, e.g., Hoffman 
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001) (computer-altered 
image); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (voice); Carson v. 
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (nickname 
associated with phrase implicating play on words, “The World’s Foremost 
Commodian”); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822, 827 
(9th Cir. 1974) (picture of a car identifiable with racecar driver Lothar Motschenbacher); 
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(videotape); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) 
(statistics); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001) 
(lithographic reproduction), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 806 (2002); Palmer v. Schonhorn 
Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 459, 462 (N.J. 1967) (statistical profile).  The right of 
publicity is analogous to the right of privacy when assessing the definition of identity.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 46 cmt. a (1995) (“Although not 
directly applicable, the rules stated here may be useful by analogy in evaluating claims 
under the right of privacy arising from an unauthorized commercial exploitation of a 
person’s identity.”).  The Ninth Circuit even accorded the distinction of the persona of 
Vanna White on a robot in a blonde wig.  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 
1395, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1992); accord, Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810–11 
(9th Cir. 1997) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed with proof that the robots bore sufficient 
resemblance to the plaintiffs); see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 
619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the right of publicity will “cover anything that 
suggests the plaintiff’s personal identity” (collecting cases)); Mark D. Robins, Publicity 
Rights in the Digital Media, Part I, THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Nov. 2000, at 7–8. 
 297. White, 971 F.2d at 1395. 
 298. Id. at 1398 (“A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed only 
through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the 
clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.”). 
 299. See Robins, supra note 296, at 7 (citing the White and Wendt decisions as 
examples of identification through extrinsic indicia). 
 300. This is not to say that a profile could not eventually take the form of a visual 
representation of an individual.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 278 § 8:122, at 8-200 to 
8-202 (discussing how recent technology permits the scanning of an individual’s image 
to create a digital reproduction that can be manipulated in a computer.  This technology 
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And, indeed, at least one court has indicated that computerized records 
contained in a database represent an identity for purposes of the tort.301 
Second, aggregated financial data is also particularly likely to evoke 
identity because of its essentially biographical nature.  Financial data has 
been called a “virtual current biography” of an individual.302  
Biographical information of any type, when used for a defendant’s 
commercial benefit, has traditionally brought liability under the tort.303  
The rule is generally stated that, absent some redeeming social value or 
newsworthiness exception, any use of biographical information for 
commercial purposes without the subject’s express consent is actionable 
under the tort.304  To carry this analysis forward and apply it to the practice 
 
permits the so-called “rotoscoping” of an image so that it is now possible to superimpose 
an image of a deceased actor into a live scene interacting with live actors); see also 
PINCKAERS, supra note 8, at 419–20 (stating that technology may soon provide 
Hollywood with the option of using reanimated actors rather than hiring the real one).  
The potential for the combination of profiling and rotoscoping and the possible uses to 
which these combined technologies might be put is quite intriguing. 
 301. Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 98-0897F, 1999 WL 494114, at *6–7 (Mass. 
Super. June 29, 1999) (holding that records in a computer database are a name or 
likeness under both the common law and the Massachusetts privacy statute) [hereinafter 
Weld I]; cf. Crump v. Forbes, 52 Va. Cir. 52, 55 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (holding that an Internet 
domain name is a name under Virginia’s statutory right of action). 
 302. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 303. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. 1967) (holding that 
the use of statistical or biographical data for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name of 
the individual by using it in connection with a commercial project other than the 
dissemination of news or articles or biographies provided liability under the 
appropriation privacy tort); accord Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 
(D. Minn. 1970).  The tort is invoked by virtue of the unconsented use of the information 
for some benefit of the defendant.  See Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 
904, 909–10 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that the infringing use must be mainly for purposes 
of trade, without a redeeming public interest, news or historical value); Palmer, 232 
A.2d at 462 (“[A]lthough the publication of biographical data of a well-known figure 
does not per se constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of that same data for the 
purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial 
project other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does.”); Flores v. 
Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. 1959) (distinguishing use of photo in item 
of general public interest and information versus “a use in, or as part of, an 
advertisement or solicitation for patronage”); Rall v. Hellman, 726 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632 
(App. Div. 2001) (stating in dicta that a fabricated e-mail discussion may have been 
actionable under the appropriation tort if it had attracted customers to defendant’s Web 
site); Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1995) 
(commenting that if the ads at issue used plaintiff’s name and likeness to advertise 
products unrelated to news dissemination, plaintiff would have stated a claim for relief). 
 304. See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (1977).  Because the 
cornerstone of the tort is appropriation for purposes of taking advantage of some value 
associated with an individual, biographical information that is published for a 
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of profiling, a financial institution’s use of a customer’s transaction data for 
marketing purposes in no way provides newsworthy information to the 
public.  Nor does it fill a socially useful purpose or substantially add to 
cultural values.  Rather, the sole purpose behind profiling and the sale of 
profiled information by financial institutions is to enable the financial 
institutions to increase their profitability and market dominance.  Therefore 
the use of a consumer’s transaction data for marketing purposes is not likely 
to be subject to the newsworthiness exception.305 
A third approach to demonstrating that a computer profile is a form of 
identity under the appropriation tort is to recognize that the data profile 
may be a type of photograph.  Photography can no longer be defined as a 
chemical process.306  Because photographs and other visual images are 
now often created, stored, and transferred in a digital form, a photograph 
is now most accurately defined as data that, when combined in aggregate 
form, creates an image that invokes an associational linkage to a distinct 
and recognizable individual.307  Thus, a photograph is just another form 
of information.  And aggregated information, when profiled, creates the 
 
newsworthy, parody or entertainment purpose is not actionable.  Id. at cmt d. 
 305. One very attractive feature of the appropriation tort may be its ability to sustain 
most First Amendment challenges.  Although the issue has not yet been passed upon by 
the Supreme Court, the appropriation branch of the right of privacy, being a personal 
right with proprietary overtones, is likely to trump the somewhat limited First 
Amendment protections that are accorded to commercial speech under the Central 
Hudson balancing test.  Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  “The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”  Id. at 562 
(citation omitted).  But see U.S. West Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 
1999) (striking down an FCC order restricting the use, disclosure and access to a 
telecommunications customer’s proprietary network information without the customer’s 
prior express opt-in to the disclosure, because the regulation did not directly and 
materially advance the government’s interest in privacy).  But if profiling activities are 
deemed to be more deceptive than informational in character, the activity would 
probably receive no First Amendment protection.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 
(“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising.  Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the 
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about 
lawful activity.  The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive 
the public than to inform it.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).  However, the 
regulation of computer profiling activities may escape First Amendment scrutiny 
altogether.  The Supreme Court has also indicated that computer processing is a “thing in 
interstate commerce,” and thus the First Amendment protections of commercial speech 
may be completely inapposite to data profiling and, possibly, to data exchange.  See 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000). 
 306. See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1102 (college ed. 1964) (defining 
photography as a process “producing images of objects upon a photo sensitive surface by 
the chemical action of light or other radiant energy”). 
 307. See LAUDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 26.  In the words of Bill Gates, “The world 
is totally going digital.”  Id.  This digitization means that information of all types, television, 
movies, telecommunications, books, home shopping and bill paying, and all other forms of 
audio and video images will soon take the uniform form of digital bits.  See id. 
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same associative capture of identity as does a photograph.  In fact, some 
technical literature describing the technology of profiling uses the 
illustrative example of a phased-resolution digital photograph to depict 
how the increased aggregation of information will eventually produce a 
“clear enough image of your customer that you can create and market a 
product to her that will fit her like a glove.”308  Personally identifiable 
transaction data, when profiled, can thus be described as a personality 
“portrait”309 or behavioral photograph of an individual, and it should 
reasonably receive the same level of protection under the appropriation 
tort as does its photographic counterpart. 
An analysis of the interrelation of the appropriation and publicity torts 
with copyright law further shows that the exact tangible expression of 
the identity is somewhat irrelevant and that the material issue is whether 
the subject’s persona is identifiable by the tangible expression.  The law 
is settled that the persona is not copyrightable.310  Although it is not 
settled to what extent and in what circumstances copyright pre-emption 
does or does not apply to the persona,311 cases dealing with copyright 
pre-emption generally demonstrate that the persona is distinct and 
separate from the tangible expression of the persona that may be subject 
to copyright law.312  There is some quality of a person’s being that, 
 
 308. Id. at 442. 
 309. ONLINE PROFILING FTC REPORT, supra note 10, at 16 (“[T]he [ac]cumulation 
over time of vast numbers of seemingly minor details about an individual produces a 
portrait that is quite comprehensive and, to many inherently intrusive.”). 
 310. See 1 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][c], at 1-24 
(2001) (“A persona can hardly be said to constitute a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the 
meaning of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.  A fortiori, it is not a ‘work of 
authorship’ under the Act.” (citations omitted)). 
 311. See, e.g., Mark D. Robins, Publicity Rights in the Digital Media, Part II, THE 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Dec. 2000, at 29, 32 (“[I]t is far from clear that the aspects 
of the actor’s identity can be separated from the copyrightable dramatic performance and 
given protection without eviscerating the [copy]right to prepare derivative works.”). 
 312. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 658–59 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
the tort of misappropriation protects a person’s persona, which is not copyrightable 
because it does not consist of a writing of an author; placement in or on a tangible 
medium does not change this analysis); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (“A voice is not copyrightable. . . .  What is put forward as protectible here is 
more personal than any work of authorship.”); Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 
2d 337, 352–53 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that a voice is not copyrightable, as distinguished 
from  the copyrightable recording of a voice); Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 
F. Supp. 2d 823, 836–37 (C.D. Cal. 1998); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
713, 722–23 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that because a persona is not copyrightable, the 
unauthorized publication is not the equivalent of a copyright infringement claim and is 
not preempted).  The legislative history also indicates congressional intent to not apply 
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although captured by a tangible medium, is distinct from the tangible 
medium.  Thus, what constitutes an indicia of the persona relates simply 
to whether the tangible expression is evocative of and identifiable to an 
individual, and not to the material form or substance of the tangible 
medium.  Profiled financial data is distinctly identifiable by virtue of an 
account number or social security number that relates the profile to a 
particular person.  A profile is furthermore evocative of the data subject 
in that it derives its market value by virtue of its ability to create an 
identification with, and by its ability to predict the behavior of a 
particular person.  Thus, a computer profile should unquestionably be 
found to constitute an indicia of identity. 
3.  How Is the Interest Invaded? 
The appropriation privacy tort is typically invaded by the defendant’s 
advertising use of the plaintiff’s identity.313  Although some courts have 
sought to limit the tort’s coverage to only apply to advertising use,314 the 
law does not restrict the tort in this way.315  But in general, advertising 
use is broadly construed by the courts,316 and includes any form of use 
that might be an advertisement in disguise.317  Furthermore, no actual 
endorsement of a product by the plaintiff is necessary to establish an 
advertising use.318  Profiling could easily be found to constitute advertising 
use because profiling facilitates marketing activities targeted individually 
at the consumer for purposes of inducing the consumer to purchase 
particular products or services.  Thus, even though technology provides 
the capacity to advertise to a micro-segmented audience of only one 
individual, it is still advertising toward that one individual.  And because 
the tort does not require any actual endorsement of a product by the 
plaintiff, the fact that the advertising is directed back at the data subject 
himself, rather than at third parties, should not make any difference for 
 
copyright pre-emption to the persona.  See H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748 (“The evolving common law rights of ‘privacy,’ 
‘publicity’ and trade secrets . . . would remain unaffected as long as the causes of action 
contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or 
confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.”). 
 313. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 77 cmt. (1990). 
 314. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994); Shibley 
v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977) (“[The tort] 
applies . . . when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness for his 
own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though 
the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.”). 
 316. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 77 (1990) (defining advertising use as “the use of a 
person’s name or picture for all types of promotional endeavors”). 
 317. See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 318. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. 1959). 
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purposes of defining profiling as advertising under the tort. 
But, the tort also includes within its parameters any other use of the 
plaintiff’s persona that accrues to the defendant’s benefit.319  The  
concept of benefit has been broadly defined and, unless otherwise 
limited by statute, does not require that the benefit be economic.320 
Profiling handsomely benefits a financial institution.  And it is immaterial 
for purposes of the appropriation tort whether that benefit comes in the 
form of the economic benefits of increased sales generated by targeted 
marketing or through the increased profits from risk-based credit pricing, 
or in the somewhat less tangible goodwill that accrues to the financial 
institution through increased customer satisfaction or efficiency. 
4.  What Constitutes an Appropriation? 
Assuming that profiling provides a benefit to financial institutions by 
means of the use of consumers’ identities, it is then necessary to 
continue the analysis to determine whether profiling also implicates an 
appropriation.  Appropriation under the tort occurs only where the 
defendant “appropriate[s] to his own use or benefit the reputation, 
prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of 
the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” 
 
 319. For instance, liability under the tort has been found where a defendant derived 
some benefit from the impersonation or mimicry of an individual.  See e.g., Wendt v. 
Host Intern., Inc. 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (robot look alike); Waits v. Frito-Lay 
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (sound alike); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992) (robot look alike); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 
849 F.2d 460, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988) (sound alike); Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. 
Supp. 2d 337, 339–41 (D.N.J. 2000) (sound alike); Onassis v. Christian-Dior N.Y., Inc., 
472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256, 263 (App. Div. 1984) (look alike).  Of course, any discussion of 
the right of publicity would not be complete without an Elvis case.  See, e.g., Estate of 
Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1361 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis impersonator).  
The benefit found in each of these cases is analogous to that derived from profiling, 
where the benefit a commercial entity receives is by virtue of the computer profile’s 
ability to simulate or mimic a consumer’s future behavior. 
 320. Thus, benefit has been found where a scientist’s name was used as an internal 
code name for a new product in development, Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. 
Supp. 1072, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1994), where defendant used plaintiff’s name to provide a 
father for an illegitimate child on a birth certificate, Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97, 97, 
101 (N.J. 1907), where defendant used a plaintiff’s name on a petition without consent, 
Schwartz v. Edrington, 62 So. 660, 662–63 (La. 1913), and where defendant forged 
plaintiff’s signature on an income-tax return, Schlessman v. Schlessman, 361 N.E.2d 
1347, 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).  Statutory privacy actions often limit the parameters of 
the tort to uses of the plaintiff’s identity for commercial benefit.  For a review of state 
statutes, see ELDER, supra note 269, at 449–72. 
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Perhaps because the concept of benefit is so amorphous and because 
the scope of appropriation is so potentially far reaching under the tort, 
courts limit the scope of appropriation in several ways.  First, 
appropriation does not include uses of a plaintiff’s identity that are of 
general public interest or that otherwise accrue to society’s general 
benefit.321  Second, courts have consistently declined to find tort liability 
where the information does not have a meaning-making or value-
creating aspect for the appropriator.322  Third, when applying the tort to 
information privacy, courts have required some use or disclosure of the 
information that infringes the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.323  Therefore, when applying the tort to information privacy, an 
appropriation occurs only where the following three factors are present: 
(1) the use of the information is outside the scope of a socially beneficial 
function, such as fraud detection, crime prevention or national security; 
(2) the personal information is collected, aggregated and processed in 
such a manner as to create value for the data collector; and (3) where the 
use of the information is inherently intrusive or is used for purposes that 
otherwise infringe the consumer’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
And indeed, one court recently applied this analysis to the profiling of 
medical information and found the appropriation tort actionable.  The 
trio of cases in the Weld v. CVS action324 may change the paradigms of 
tort law relating to information privacy.  The Weld case arose from CVS 
Pharmacy’s entry into an alliance agreement with several drug company 
partners, whereby it agreed to sell its customers’ private transaction 
information to these drug companies for marketing purposes.325  The 
 
 321. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text. 
 322. But see Bartow, supra note 128, at 695–96 (suggesting that where data is 
compiled it can have broad meaning or can serve as the basis for broad meaning-making 
to the same extent that a celebrity’s image has meaning-making power); cf. Dwyer v. 
Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff 
failed the test of appropriation because: “[A] single, random cardholder’s name has little 
or no intrinsic value to defendants . . . .  Furthermore, defendants’ practices do not 
deprive any of the cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”).  
Three accordant decisions discuss the sale of a customer’s name to a third party for 
marketing purposes without the customer’s consent.  See generally Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d 
1351; Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); U.S. News & World 
Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996 WL 1065557 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996).  
These cases have generally stood for the principle that the sale of names to a third party 
in a subscription list is not deemed an appropriation for purposes of the tort. 
 323. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1355; Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339–40. 
 324. See Weld I, supra note 301; Weld v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-
0897, 1999 WL 1565175 (Mass. Super. Nov. 19, 1999), aff’d, Weld v Glaxo Wellcome, 
Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 2001). 
 325. CVS began the program in 1998, using profiles extracted from its database of 
transaction information to identify those customers that might be potential targets for 
marketing offers from its drug company partners.  CVS first profiled its customers to 
determine to whom to send the mailings.  It then provided a third party with a disk 
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consumer outrage over CVS’ marketing program eventually caused CVS 
to abandon this practice, but not before several lawsuits were filed by 
consumers who received these solicitations.  Several plaintiffs 
accordingly brought suit under, inter alia, Massachusetts’s statutory right 
of privacy,326 “tortuous misappropriation of private and personal 
information,”327 and state unfair trade practices, premised on the 
defendant’s violation of the plaintiffs’ privacy rights.328  The court 
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and found that 
the question of whether the systematic searching of a computer database 
in conjunction with the use of the name and address of the plaintiffs for 
the defendant’s benefit constituted a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory 
right of privacy was a “novel question suitable for initial resolution by a 
jury.”329  In analyzing the applicability of the common law appropriation 
tort to the facts of the case, the court looked at whether the use of the 
information was for socially beneficial purposes or whether such use 
was merely for defendants’ financial gain.330  Next, the court noted the 
inherent invasiveness of the profiling of medical records.331  The court 
had separately found that the consumer had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his prescription drug information.332  The court therefore held 
that the use of plaintiff’s pharmaceutical records for the defendant’s 
financial gain fell within the scope of the common law appropriation 
privacy cause of action.333 
There is no reason not to apply the same rationale to the profiling of 
 
containing a listing of the targeted customers’ names, addresses, and dates of birth.  The 
third party then provided the disk to a mail fulfillment house, which sent out mailings to 
the customers.  The mailings reminded the customers to refill their prescription 
medications, provided information concerning new drugs, or encouraged them to discuss 
certain conditions with their doctors.  Funding for these mailings was provided entirely by 
the drug manufacturers.  CVS’ customers were never informed nor did they give consent to 
the disclosures that occurred under this program.  See Weld I, supra note 301, at *1–2. 
 326. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (1974). 
 327. Weld I, supra note 301, at *6–8.  The court extrapolated the common law 
appropriation privacy cause of action from the pleadings, regardless of the fact that the 
appropriation privacy tort does not depend on the confidential nature of the information 
or on any disclosure.  Id.  Whether the plaintiff actually intended to plead the common 
law appropriation tort is unclear; the plaintiff did plead the analogous statutory cause of 
action.  Id. at *3–5. 
 328. Id. at *6. 
 329. Id. at *5. 
 330. Id. at *6. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at *6–7. 
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financial information, which has been analogized to medical 
information.334  First, profiling for marketing purposes cannot be said to 
have a purpose that is beneficial for any other goal than the financial 
institution’s own profit motive.  Second, aggregated financial data is 
deemed predictive of future behavior and, unlike a simple address list, 
can be used to manipulate a consumer and create meaning and value for 
the data collector.335  Sensitive financial transaction data cannot be 
described as trivial but rather can include hundreds of thousands of 
purchases that produce a very invasive picture of the individual 
consumer.  And that picture may be used for such nontrivial uses as 
predicting that individual’s future behavior and thereby shifting the 
economic balance of power from the consumer.  Third, profiling of 
financial data provides a very granular picture of an individual’s 
personal behavior and beliefs that is inherently intrusive.  Furthermore, 
in the same way as a customer of a pharmacy has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in prescription drug information, a customer of a 
financial institution also has a reasonable expectation of privacy that his 
or her personal financial profile will not be used for marketing purposes 
without express or implied consent. 
 
 334. Rob Blackwell, Bush Privacy Decision: Financial Data Next?  AM. BANKER, 
April 18, 2001, at 1 (“Financial privacy is in many ways just as sensitive as medical 
privacy, in that much of our private personal spending involves health.  Your financial 
records are your family’s DNA and should not be reproduced or transmitted to others 
without your permission.”). 
 335. An approach that distinguishes a simple customer list, phone number or other 
solitary data point from an aggregated profile of an individual for purposes of liability 
under the tort is in accord with economic analysis as well.  Posner in his law review 
article containing an economic analysis of the law of privacy, approves withholding any 
privacy right in a name or address because it follows an efficient economic rationale.  
Posner, supra note 81, at 398–99.  In Posner’s view, the high transaction costs inherent 
in obtaining a customer’s consent prior to any disclosure of their information to third 
parties in a mailing list outweigh any possible worth to the individual of being shielded 
from that disclosure.  This is because, in Posner’s words, the information about the 
subscribers that is disclosed is “trivial.”  Id.  However, Posner goes on to suggest that the 
economic analysis of personal information changes when the purchaser of the 
information can use that information to “impose substantial costs on the subscribers” or 
otherwise can use the information to gain an economic advantage over the person to 
whom the information pertains.  Id. at 399.  Thus, under Posner’s economic analysis of 
the tort, because profiling allows a business to use a customer’s information to gain a 
distinct economic advantage, profiling should bring liability under a privacy cause of 
action.  An argument can also be made that a financial institution is the cheaper cost 
avoider and, just as a consumer goods manufacturer is required to design all reasonable 
safety features into its products, a data collector should similarly be required to obtain a 
consumer’s express consent prior to using a consumer’s data for profiling purposes.  The 
transaction costs of protecting privacy are actually quite low.  An opt-in program for data 
sharing would cost a mere seventeen cents per day per customer if, in a worst-case 
scenario, less than ten percent of customers agreed to opt-in.  Frank Hayes, Privacy?  
Bank on It, COMPUTERWORLD, May 7, 2001, at 78. 
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
[VOL. 39:  943, 2002]  Consumer Profiling in Financial Services 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1009 
C.  The Limits of Consent: The Right to Privacy Versus                                 
the Privacy Policy 
Whether the right of privacy against the profiling of personal financial 
information arises out of the intrusion branch or the appropriation branch 
of the privacy tort, it is likely that a colorable claim of invasion of 
privacy could be made.  Indeed, the fact that financial information is 
accorded a particularly private status is a concept that has long been 
ingrained in the social consciousness.336  In recognition of this fact, 
financial institutions have traditionally published privacy policies that 
served to articulate and clarify the general parameters of their existing 
common law duties for the protection of personal financial 
information.337  However, gradually the privacy policy has ceased to fill 
this traditional role and now under the GLBA, operates to contract 
around a consumer’s reasonable expectation of privacy and permits the 
financial institution to sell a customer’s private account information to 
third parties unless the customer opts out of that disclosure.338  However, 
the states are permitted to establish laws that are more protective of 
privacy than those set forth in the GLBA.339  And judicial recognition of 
the common law privacy torts in the context of financial privacy, no less 
 
 336. Until recently, the fact that a bank would even consider itself at liberty to use 
its customer’s personal financial information for marketing purposes would have been 
unthinkable.  See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (“It 
is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself at liberty to disclose the 
intimate details of its depositors’ accounts.  Inviolate secrecy is on of the inherent and 
fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers . . . .”). 
 337. See FISCHER, supra note 157, at 5-15 (stating that the privacy policy has “the 
goal of making disclosures of customer information conform to the norm of 
confidentiality in the industry to which the institution belongs”).  This is consistent with 
the general law applicable to adhesion contracts; that is, they generally are enforceable 
only to the extent they do not deviate significantly from an implied “set of background 
rules” grounded in common law and social norms.  See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1181–83 (1983). 
 338. See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., CHASE PRIVACY POLICY 2 (n.d.) (“Chase 
shares information it has about you . . . to give you superior customer service, provide 
convenient access to our services and make a wider range of products available to you.”). 
 339. Existing federal legislation is likely not to pre-empt state tort law which would 
mandate an opt-in standard.  The GLBA provides the states with the opportunity to enact 
laws that are more protective of privacy if these laws are not in conflict with the GLBA.  
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  It is doubtful that an opt-in standard would 
be in conflict with the GLBA, which sets forth as its controlling purpose the proposition 
that financial institutions have an “affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the 
privacy of [their] customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those 
customers’ nonpublic personal information.”  15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000). 
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than action by the legislature, would be one mechanism for the states to 
establish such privacy protections.340  If the privacy tort were given such 
judicial recognition, the question would then arise as to whether the opt-
out privacy policies currently in use by financial institutions would 
operate as a waiver of the consumer’s right of privacy. 
The ancient legal maxim, volenti fit injuria sets forth the fundamental 
legal principle that there is no wrong done to one who consents.341  
Consent is therefore an affirmative defense to a privacy cause of 
action.342  Consent is willingness for conduct to occur.343  To be deemed 
effective, consent (1) must be made by one who has the capacity to 
consent, and (2) is effective only within the scope and within any 
conditions of the consent.344  Consent is void where given under a 
substantial misrepresentation or mistake.345  Under the stringent 
informed consent parameters of tort law, it is unlikely that an opt-out 
process demonstrates sufficient consent to waive a privacy right.346 
McCarthy views the principle of consent to be synonymous to a 
license to the privacy right.347  Under this analysis, recent decisions 
concerning the enforceability of “click-wrap” licenses are instructive in 
analyzing the enforceability of privacy polices.  In Specht v. Netscape 
Communications Corp.,348 the District Court for the Southern District of 
 
 340. As was expressed by Nimmer in his argument for the establishment of the right 
of publicity: 
This raises the final question of the right of our courts, in the absence of 
legislation, to enforce a right not previously recognized.  Here we may return 
to the essay by Brandeis and Warren . . . .  The argument was there advanced 
that ‘the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common law’ 
would with respect to the right of privacy ‘enable the judges to afford the 
requisite protection, without the interposition of the legislature.’  That this 
proved true is attested by judicial opinions in fifteen jurisdictions. 
Nimmer, supra note 284, at 223 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 195). 
 341. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “One who effectively consents to 
conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the 
conduct or harm resulting from it.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 A (1977). 
 342. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 343. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977).  Although consent does not 
need to be manifested by express words or action, no cases have been reported where 
consent was not manifested but was still proved.  Id. cmt. b reporters’ notes. 
 344. Id. § 892A.  Consent can also generally be revoked at any time.  Id.  There is a 
strong presumption of revocability where the consent is gratuitous.  See McAndrews v. 
Roy, 131 So. 2d 256, 259 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 271 
N.Y.S. 187, 188–89 (Sup. Ct. 1933).  
 345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1977). 
 346. See Litman, supra note 116, at 1310–11 (“The tort law version of consent 
doesn’t depend on formalities like opt-in or opt-out.  Rather it requires that the subject 
appreciate the act that she consents to and be in fact willing that it occur.”). 
 347. See MCCARTHY, supra note 277 §10:21, at 10-31 to 10-32 (“There is no reason 
[the rules of consent] could not also be viewed as rules governing a ‘license’ of the 
privacy right . . . .”). 
 348. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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New York, using California law, reviewed the enforceability of an 
online license that did not require the licensee to click “I agree” before 
downloading the licensor’s software.349 The court, comparing the license 
to a “browse-wrap” license,350 refused to hold the arbitration clause in the 
license enforceable.  The court reasoned that because the licensee was not 
made aware that he was entering into a contract and not required to do 
anything to manifest assent other than take possession of the product,351 
no contract was formed.352  Specht is a significant case, because the 
court based its holding not on any substantive unconscionability of the 
arbitration clause, but rather on procedural unconscionability, based on 
the lack of the adherent’s actual assent.353  Although procedural 
unconscionability has been a largely dormant legal principle in light of the 
practical necessity for adhesion contracts in mass market transactions, the 
Specht case demonstrates that there are still limits to consent by 
adhesion.354  A similar recognition of procedural unconscionability is 
 
 349. This license permitted the licensee to download the software absent any 
requirement to affirmatively to indicate their assent to the license agreement, or even to 
view the license agreement.  If the licensee chose to click on the underlined text in the 
invitation, a hypertext link took the licensee to a Web page entitled “License & Support 
Agreements” where the licensee could view the terms of the license.  Id. at 588.  
Plaintiffs alleged that their usage of the software improperly permitted the defendant to 
receive private information about the user’s file transfer activity on the Internet.  Id. at 587. 
 350. A browse-wrap license refers to where a Web site offers proprietary 
information, subject to the user’s acceptance of an online license agreement.  The user is 
not required to click on an icon expressing assent to the license, or even to view its 
terms, before proceeding to use the information on the site.  Id. at 594. 
 351. Id. at 595 (“The only hint that a contract is being formed is one small box of 
text referring to the license agreement, text that appears below the screen used for 
downloading and that a user need not even see before obtaining the product . . . .”). 
 352. Id. at 596 (“The case law on software licensing has not eroded the importance 
of assent in contract formation.  Mutual assent is the bedrock of any agreement to which 
the law will give force.  Defendants’ position, if accepted, would so expand the 
definition of assent as to render it meaningless.”). 
 353. Id.  Unconscionability takes both a procedural and substantive form.  See 
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).  Procedural unconscionability relates to the inability of the 
consumer to negotiate terms of the contract.  Substantive unconscionability relates to the 
imposition of harsh or oppressive terms on the adherent.  See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger 
et al., Consumer Protection Rules in and Around the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA), INTERNET L. & BUS., Nov. 2001, at 11.  Because contracts of 
adhesion are an accepted form of transacting commerce in mass-market consumer 
transactions, which by definition involve procedural unconscionability, most 
unconscionability claims in the online environment either must involve the imposition of 
oppressively harsh terms (a rare instance) or (more typically) must involve a limitation 
of remedies.  Id. at 11–13. 
 354. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 
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found in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), 
whereby a “procedural breakdown” in an online contract can invalidate a 
contractual term.355 
If this analysis is applied to an information transfer under an opt-out 
privacy policy, a similar conclusion results, even though the licensor of 
personal information fills the unusual role of the adherent to the 
purported contract.356  Under opt-out privacy policies, the adherent is not 
required to do anything to manifest assent to be bound to the terms of the 
privacy policy.  An opt-out privacy policy written in fine print, 
containing highly complex terms, received with a monthly billing 
statement stuffed with advertisements, is perhaps more suspect on 
procedural grounds than an online license that does not require the 
adherent to click “I agree” to the license terms.  Furthermore, the privacy 
policies developed by financial institutions in the wake of the GLBA are 
particularly suspect procedurally, because they often contain unusually 
broad or rather vague statements of the permissible uses of customer 
data.357  And although a consumer ostensibly has the right to opt-out of 
information sharing, a broad interpretation of the exceptions in the GLBA 
may encourage a financial institution to utilize these exceptions to 
substantially eviscerate the consumer’s opt-out choice.358  It is therefore 
likely that the only contract for the licensing of personal information 
formed by these opt-out privacy policies is the implied contract defined by 
the social norms set forth by the financial institution’s duty of 
confidentiality and the customer’s reasonable expectation of privacy.359 
Therefore, in the face of a privacy tort claim, a privacy policy based on 
an opt-out mechanism would probably be effective to show consent only 
 
75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1159 (2000) (“[W]e should notice that it matters to what extent the 
world of exchange consists of these contracts that are suspect on autonomy grounds.  If 
people right and left are having their entitlements rearranged . . . without their consent, 
that is a different social world.”). 
 355. UCITA § 111 Official Cmt. 3 (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.pdf.  UCITA is a model statute focusing on electronic commerce.  
See id. at Prefatory Note. 
 356. Margaret Jane Radin suggests that adhesion contracts for privacy rights may be 
suspect on substantive unconscionability grounds as well.  “[P]olicymakers [must] take 
on the task of deciding which terms it is important to draw buyers’ attention to in order 
to preserve their autonomy, and which kinds of terms must be simply excluded on 
autonomy grounds.  Redress limited to Los Angeles could be in the first category; waiver 
of all personal privacy rights could be in the second.”  Radin, supra note 354, at 1161 
(discussing whether or not the liberal social construct of consent should be retained). 
 357. See, e.g., BANK OF AM. CORP., PRIVACY POLICY FOR CONSUMERS (2002) (“We 
collect and use various types of [customer] information to service your accounts, save 
you time and money, and better respond to your needs.”). 
 358. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
 359. The few courts that have construed privacy policies have interpreted them very 
narrowly.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Nationsbank, 776 A.2d 645, 651–53 (Md. 2001). 
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to the extent it materially aligns with the consumer’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  As previously demonstrated, most profiling 
activities are quite likely to fail this test.  A financial institution is 
therefore well-advised to refrain from undertaking profiling activities 
merely on the basis of an opt-out privacy policy.  Rather, it should fully 
disclose and obtain the consumer’s express opt-in consent prior to 
undertaking any intrusive profiling activities and prior to any sharing of 
data with third parties for such purposes.  Practices that do not conform to 
this standard may subject a financial institution to liability under common 
law privacy causes of action.  And, the common law privacy tort can also 
serve as a foundation for a consumer to launch additional statutory claims. 
D.  Potential Remedies Under the Theory: Utilizing the                           
“Little FTC Acts” 
Although the privacy tort may provide a valid cause of action with 
which to challenge profiling activities by financial services entities, the 
difficulty of establishing damages significant enough to make the claim 
worthwhile serves as an impediment to any practical use of the cause 
of action.  In cases involving tortious use of the plaintiff’s financial 
information, the plaintiff’s actual damages may be quite small or 
otherwise difficult to prove or quantify.360  The only practical method of 
litigating the claim would be by virtue of a class action.  And class 
actions founded on a privacy tort claim are quite difficult to certify and 
are subject to numerous other procedural challenges.361 
For these reasons, a privacy cause of action is perhaps useful only in 
the respect that it can serve as leverage to support a cause of action 
under existing consumer fraud and unfair trade practices statutes.362  
 
 360. Under the appropriation tort, a plaintiff may recover for the loss of the 
exclusive use of the value so appropriated.  One who suffers intrusion on seclusion may 
recover damages for deprivation of that seclusion.  In addition, the plaintiff may recover 
damages for emotional distress or humiliation that normally results from such an 
invasion.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H cmt. a (1977) (emphasis added). 
 361. See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct App. 1975) 
(“Because this right to privacy which is being asserted differs from person to person . . . 
it cannot be said that appellants’ claims are typical of the class as a whole.”). 
 362. Other statutes provide remedies as well.  For instance, the appropriation and 
intrusion privacy torts, if expanded to information privacy issues, could substantially 
change the analysis of liability for Internet profiling under the Wiretap Act.  18 U.S.C. § 
2511 (2000).  Recent cases where plaintiffs have sought to obtain relief from corporate 
profiling practices under this statute have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, inter 
alia, because the plaintiff was not able to fulfill the requirement of the statute that 
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Recognizing the effectiveness of the consumer fraud statutes in the 
protection of information privacy, state attorneys general have recently 
utilized these laws to attempt to protect financial privacy.363  These 
actions evolved from some rather egregious behavior by banks in their 
use of consumer transaction data—financial institutions quietly began 
trading their customers’ personal financial information to direct 
marketers (perhaps relying on their privacy policies that purported to 
permit such unlimited uses).  The consumer outrage quickly led the 
attorneys general of several states to bring investigations of these 
practices based on state consumer protection laws.364  These actions have 
deterred not only the institutions that were subject to the investigations, 
but have also spurred quite a bit of self-regulation by financial 
institutions in general,365 and many institutions have even temporarily 
halted or reduced many disclosures of financial information to third 
 
plaintiff prove that he or she had been harmed by defendant’s commission of a tortious 
act.  Id. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter . . . unless such 
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act 
in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States or of any State.”).  See, e.g., 
In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277–78 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding a “bare 
allegation” not enough to survive motion to dismiss, thus the court concluded not that 
plaintiffs’ claims were false, but simply that they failed to allege a tortious purpose); In re 
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing 
plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act as follows: “In light of the abundant evidence that 
DoubleClick’s motivations have been licit and commercial and the utter lack of evidence 
that its intent has been tortious, we find as a matter of law that plaintiffs have failed to 
allege that DoubleClick has acted with a ‘tortious’ purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
 363. See generally Fickenscher, supra note 257. 
 364. Most notable was the New York Attorney General’s consent decree with 
Chase Manhattan.  The attorney general made an inquiry and found that Chase had 
violated, inter alia, the consumer protection laws of the State of New York.  See In re 
Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., (N.Y. Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Prot. Jan 21, 
2000) (assurance of discontinuance pursuant to executive law § 63(15)), reprinted in 
SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW, supra note 13, at 247–58.  See generally 
Fickenscher, supra note 257.  Chase Manhattan was reportedly selling account 
information about its customers to several marketers of nonfinancial products.  Chase’s 
privacy policy was central to the attorney general Spitzer’s case.  Because Chase 
allegedly did not follow its own privacy policy, the state lawsuit would largely have been 
based on state laws against deceptive labor practices.  After meeting with the attorney 
general, Chase agreed to limit its information sharing to names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of customer’s approving of such uses.  Id.  U.S. Bancorp was investigated by 
twenty state attorneys general for similar practices including the sale of consumer credit 
report information.  The bank was sued by the Minnesota Attorney General for allegedly 
violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  Id.  More recently, the Minnesota Attorney 
General filed suit against Fleet Mortgage Corporation on state consumer fraud and 
deceptive trade practices laws pursuant to Fleet’s use of customer information for a 
telemarketing campaign.  State v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d  962, 964–65 
(D. Minn. 2001).  Fleet’s motion to dismiss was denied on all counts.  Id. at 968. 
 365. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 6, at 263–66.  But some of the self-
regulatory behavior results only in the publication of information without offering any 
real protections to consumers.  Id. at 264. 
FINALGERTZ.DOC 2/11/2020  3:23 PM 
[VOL. 39:  943, 2002]  Consumer Profiling in Financial Services 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1015 
party marketing organizations.366  Some have thus suggested that the 
solution for information privacy in general may lie in the effective 
utilization of unfair competition laws.367 
However, consumer protection laws do have limitations in their 
application to information privacy.  State consumer protection laws generally 
require proof of an unfair, unlawful, or deceptive trade practice to be 
successful.368  Because state statutes generally are modeled after the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),369 a showing of unfairness 
requires a practice to “cause[ ] or [be] likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or to competition.”370 Because this is a very difficult burden for the 
plaintiff to meet, most litigated cases are based instead on the “deception” 
subset.371  The practical effect of this is that the financial institution’s 
publication of a privacy policy that informs the customer of the uses and 
disclosures of transaction data and complies with the requirements of the 
GLBA generally is not deemed deceptive.372  Any use of deceptive trade 
 
 366. Fickenscher, supra note 257.  However, these salutary effects precede the 
enactment of the GLBA, which may reverse this trend by legitimizing the transfer of 
transaction data to affiliates as well as to third parties, subject to financial institutions’ 
compliance with the GLBA’s notice requirements.  See supra notes 227–31 and 
accompanying text. 
 367. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 111; see also Fickenscher, supra note 257 (stating 
that the New York Attorney General’s privacy settlement with Chase Manhattan Corp. 
could be a “blueprint for addressing the issue of the use of customer data”).  Fickenscher 
suggests that New York’s action against Chase would likely have centered on allegations 
of Chase’s deceptive contravention of its own privacy policy.  Id. 
 368. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 1992 & Supp 2002).  
California’s Business and Professions Code, regulating unfair business practices, 
requires the commission of “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice 
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” to be actionable.  Id.  Courts 
have construed the Act to be based in the right of the public to protection from fraud and 
deceit.  See People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat’l Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520–21 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962).  An unfair business practice is one that “offends an established 
public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or 
substantially injurious to consumers.”  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234–35 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent 
Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
 369. Sovern, supra note 111, at 1352. 
 370. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000). 
 371. See Sovern, supra note 111, at 1352; see also Michael M. Greenfield, 
Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on State Law, 46 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1869, 1877 (2000) (discussing cases litigated before the FTC). 
 372. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc., v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 
P.2d 527, 541 (Cal. 1999) (holding that under the California Business and Professions 
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practices law would therefore normally require a fact pattern where a 
financial institution violates it own privacy policy, greatly limiting the 
scope of use of state consumer protection laws for financial privacy. 
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) enforcement of federal unfair 
and deceptive trade practice laws under the FTC Act373 reflects this same 
limitation.  While banks, savings and loan institutions, and federal credit 
unions are outside of the Act’s purview,374 the FTC’s enforcement of the 
FTC Act does serve as a guideline to the states’ unfair and deceptive trade 
practices regulation.  The FTC has recently taken the approach that the 
publication of a privacy policy satisfies the institution’s obligations to 
consumers and provides that any use and disclosure of that data in accord 
with that privacy policy will not be in violation of deceptive trade 
practices laws.375  The FTC takes this approach in spite of the fact that the 
privacy policy effectively operates as a contract of adhesion.  
Furthermore, privacy policies are subject only to industry self-regulation 
and are not currently subject to any specific FTC requirements for what 
minimally constitutes a fair privacy policy.376  Moreover, because 
institutions are free to craft the terms of their privacy policies as they see 
fit, the actions of the state attorneys general for an institution’s breach of 
its own privacy policy under the aegis of unfair trade practices laws may 
have the practical effect of causing the institution to water down the 
privacy policies they publish in order to avoid any risk of liability for 
noncompliance under the FTC Act. Thus, unless the FTC changes its 
current policy to include a watchdog role for patently unfair privacy 
policies, the FTC Act is likely to provide protection for information 
privacy only in very limited situations.377 
However, if a tort privacy claim is deemed to exist for intrusive 
profiling activities, the analysis changes radically.  As discussed above, 
 
Code, courts may not impose their own notions of what is unfair, and legislation may 
limit the judiciary’s power to determine certain conduct as unfair). 
 373. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000). 
 374. Id. 
 375. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 506 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting a letter from the Federal Trade Commission to DoubleClick’s 
outside counsel concerning DoubleClick’s collection of clickstream data: “Based on this 
investigation, it appears to staff that DoubleClick never used or disclosed consumers’ 
[personally indentifiable information] for purposes other than those disclosed in its 
privacy policy.”) (emphasis added); see also Sovern, supra note 111, at 1322 (stating that 
the deceptive trade practices under the FTC Act are invoked only with respect to 
affirmative misrepresentations made with respect to the collection of information and 
occasionally when information is collected from children online). 
 376. The FTC does, however, articulate a suggested formulation for fair information 
practices, including notice, choice, access, and security.  FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 12. 
 377. The author favors an FTC definition of “patently unfair” including any privacy 
policy that either fails to mention the existence of profiling activities or allows any 
profiling of consumers’ data without their prior express written consent. 
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the current weakness in many consumer protection statutes aimed at 
information privacy issues is the fact that the publication of a privacy 
policy often negates the critical element of deception necessary to 
establish the cause of action.  However, if a privacy tort cause of action 
is recognized, and intrusive profiling is therefore deemed tortious, it 
would enable the use of the unlawful branch of federal and state 
consumer protection statutes.378  In addition, recent FTC statements 
indicate that a plaintiff showing a “tangible misappropriation of 
personal protected information” could establish a “substantial injury” 
and thus show a violation of the “unfair” branch of the FTC Act.379 
A consumer would therefore have ample opportunities for redress under 
the state consumer protection laws, often called the “Little FTC Acts.”  
First, a state attorney general can bring action on behalf of the state.  Next, 
most states provide a consumer with a private right of action to bring suit.  
And not only would the plaintiff be availed of tort damages, but the 
statutes usually provide statutory damages for a consumer who is 
successful in litigating a claim, including punitive damages, a minimum 
statutory amount, and often recovery of attorney fees.380 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Consumer profiling is becoming a common practice by banks, 
brokerages, and insurance companies due to improvements in technology, 
increasing competitive pressures in the industry, and the changing 
legislative and regulatory parameters for the financial services sector.  
Legislative measures to protect consumers’ financial privacy, such as the 
GLBA, have failed to include any protections against consumer 
profiling, and such protections are unlikely to be introduced by 
legislation in the near future because of the very powerful industry 
 
 378. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (Deering 2001) (includes any 
unlawful act or practice); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 229, 234 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the Business and Professions Code 
“borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices); Saunders v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that unlawful 
practices under the Act may be court made). 
 379. Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, in FTC v. 
ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 0023046 (emphasis added), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000 
/01/reversemt.htm (last visited May 27, 2002).  The case eventually ended in a consent 
agreement.  FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 00 0032, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20761 
(D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2000).  See also, Sovern, supra note 111, at 1343–48 (discussing the 
potential ramifications of the ReverseAuction.com case). 
 380. See Sovern, supra note 111, at 1350–51. 
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lobbies that tend to militate against any divestment of the industry’s 
current entitlement to a consumer’s transaction data. 
The courts’ recognition of the applicability of either the common law 
intrusion on seclusion or the appropriation privacy torts to the practice of 
consumer profiling would set a tort liability rule in motion that would 
require a consumer’s express opt-in consent before his or her personal 
financial information was disclosed or otherwise used for profiling 
purposes outside the scope of the consumer’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  For any breach of this privacy right, state and federal consumer 
protection laws could be leveraged to provide a private right of action 
that would enable consumers to recover statutory minimum damages for 
any breach of their privacy rights. 
America’s core values of equality, autonomy, and human dignity may 
be diminished if the use of profiling technology is embraced by the 
financial services industry and if society acquiesces to this practice 
without the concurrent adoption of equivalent legal protections against 
its abuses.  The common law privacy tort provides a flexible and 
workable mechanism by which individuals might control the use of their 
personal information profile, without precluding socially beneficial or 
necessary uses of that information in the process.  But unless this right is 
soon given formal recognition by the courts, information privacy rights 
in personal financial information remain tenuous at best. 
The right is fundamental and rooted in antiquity.  The remedy is 
within reach.  The words of Warren and Brandeis are as applicable now 
as when they were first written: “[T]he protection of society must come 
mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual. . . .  It is 
believed that the common law provides . . . [a weapon] forged in the 
slow fire of the centuries, and to-day fitly tempered to [the] hand.”381 







 381. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 134, at 219–20. 
